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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice John Paul Stevens' appointment to the Supreme Court
occurred during an important period of transition on the Court., His
ascendance from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals2 contributed
significantly to this transition in that it created a new majority on
the Court: five Justices appointed after the retirement of Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren. 3 During his first three Terms as a member of the
Court, Justice Stevens was the Court's most prolific author, writing
opinions in 136 cases, including sixty-five dissents, thirty-five con-
currences, and thirty-six opinions of the Court.' This apportion-
ment, along with his high level of productivity, indicates that Jus-
tice Stevens holds distinctive views, which he is not unwilling to
assert. Justice Stevens thus has an opportunity to play a significant
role in determining the future direction of a changing Court.
This Special Project undertakes an examination of Justice Ste-
vens' Supreme Court opinions in an effort to identify his philosophi-
cal orientations, to evaluate the consistency of his views, and to
1. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Kurland, The New Supreme Court, 7 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & Paoc. 1
(1973); Neuborne, The Procedural Assault on the Warren Legacy: A Study in Repeal by
Indirdection, 5 HorsTRu L. REV. 545 (1977).
2. The United States Senate confirmed Justice Stevens' nomination to the Supreme
Court in December 1975. He had served as a Court of Appeals judge since 1970. For biographi-
cal information and an extensive study of Justice Stevens' Seventh Circuit opinions, see
Special Project, The One Hundred and First Justice: An Analysis of the Opinions of Justice
John Paul Stevens, Sitting as Judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 29 VAND. L.
REv. 125 (1976).
3. The new majority consists of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justices Brennan, White, Stewart, and Marshall were appointed
prior to Chief Justice Warren's 1968 retirement. Justice Stevens succeeded Justice William
0. Douglas, who had served since 1939. For further discussion of the symbolic importance of
Justice Stevens' appointment, see Beytagh, Mr. Justice Stevens and the Burger Court's
Uncertain Trumpet, 51 Norm DAME LAw. 946, 952 (1976).
4. These figures were derived from statistics compiled in The Supreme Court, 1977
Term, 92 HAnv. L. Rav. 1, 327 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1,
295 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HAnv. L. Rev. 1, 276 (1976). Justice Brennan
was the next most prolific author, with 133 opinions, while Chief Justice Burger wrote least,
with only 99 opinions in the three Terms. In contrast to the 136 opinions written by Justice
Stevens during his first three Terms, Justice Rehnquist authored 164 opinions in over four
Terms at the beginning of his tenure. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View,
90 HARv. L. REv. 293, 293 (1976).
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determine the extent to which he has developed workable analytical
methods. To achieve these goals, Justice Stevens' opinions are ex-
amined in three contexts: first, the area of federal-state relations,
including commerce clause and supremacy clause questions; sec-
ond, the individual rights area, emphasizing criminal constitutional
and first amendment issues, and problems of fifth and fourteenth
amendment analysis; and third, questions concerning the proper
role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional scheme. Even
though any vote cast by a Supreme Court Justice may illustrate a
significant aspect of his ideology, this Special Project limits atten-
tion to opinions authored by Justice Stevens on the assumption that
they most accurately represent his views.'
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL
AND STATE GOVERNMENTS
A. Introduction
The effective operation of a federal system of government re-
quires a balance between the lawmaking powers of central and local
government. Under the American system, the United States Consti-
tution provides this balance. Roscoe Pound stated: "A federal polity
is necessarily a legal polity. Only a constitution which is the su-
preme law of the land can hold the whole and the parts to their
appointed spheres."'
Since his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens
has indicated significant concern with the balance between the pow-
ers granted to the United States government by the Constitution
and those powers retained by the several states. His opinions recog-
nize the necessity of state autonomy in affairs of local importance,
while also acknowledging the need for broad federal power in mat-
ters requiring national uniformity. As a result, Justice Stevens ap-
parently has chosen not to ally himself with the rigid states' rights
advocacy of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,' nor has he
5. Although this Special Project focuses upon Justice Stevens' first three Terms, occa-
sional reference is made to 1978 Term cases.
6. Pound, Law and Federal Government, in FEDERALISM AS A DEMOCRATIC PRocEss 29
(1942).
7. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist appear to be allied in an effort to main-
tain state autonomy in conflicts between state and federal authority. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (upholding state's use of single-factor formula in allocating
the income of interstate business for state income tax purposes, despite potential duplicative
taxation); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (upholding state statute
prohibiting petroleum refiners and producers from operating retail service stations within the
state); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (declaring unconstitutional
the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to state government em-
ployees); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (upholding state's power,
after entering marketplace as a purchaser, to discriminate against interstate commerce). For
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accepted the complete pervasiveness of federal power allowed by a
broad reading of the commerce clause.8 This ideological independ-
ence has enabled Justice Stevens to become an important factor in
determining the direction of the Court on questions affecting the
balance of power between federal and state government.
B. The Scope of the Dormant Commerce Power
Justice Stevens' willingness to preserve some degree of auton-
omy for the states is most apparent in his opinions in cases consider-
ing challenges to state legislation under the "dormant" commerce
clause9 of the United States Constitution. Even in the absence of
affirmative congressional action, the commerce power bars state
legislation that places an undue burden on interstate commerce 0 or
that discriminates against interstate goods.I Justice Stevens' opin-
ions in this area, however, clearly limit the use of unexercised com-
merce power to invalidate state legislation.
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.12 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a Maryland statute" that provided
a state "bounty" to licensed scrap processors for the destruction of
automobiles abandoned on Maryland highways. The statute clearly
discriminated against interstate commerce by requiring non-
Maryland processors to submit substantial documentation of title
to the abandoned automobiles in order to claim the bounty, while
not requiring such documentation by Maryland processors. This
discriminatory requirement impeded the flow of abandoned auto-
mobiles to non-Maryland processors who thus were able to collect
fewer bounties from the state." The Court upheld the statute, de-
spite its discriminatory effect, holding that the activities of a state,
which has entered the marketplace as a purchaser and not a regula-
tor, are exempt from the traditional constraints of the dormant
commerce clause. Justice Stevens, concurring in the decision, differ-
entiated between "commerce which flourishes in a free market sys-
a discussion of Justice Rehnquist's ideological commitment to states' rights, see Shapiro,
supra note 4, at 294-99.
8. Justices Brennan and Marshall appear to support the broadest scope of federal power
and thus constitute an opposing force to the Burger-Rehnquist alliance on issues concerning
the balance of state and federal power. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794 (1976) (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
9. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
11. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
12. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
13. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 12, §§ 5-201 to 5-210 (1970) (repealed 1977), § 11-1002.2 (1975
Supp.) (repealed 1977).
14. 426 U.S. at 803 n.13.
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tem and commerce which owes its existence to a state subsidy pro-
gram," stating that the restrictions of the dormant commerce clause
do not apply to the latter. 5 Stevens demonstrated his concern with
protecting state autonomy by urging adoption of "a common and
correct interpretation of the Commerce Clause as primarily in-
tended . . . to inhibit the several States' power to create restrictions
on the free flow of goods within the national market, rather than to
provide the basis for questioning a State's right to experiment with
different incentives to business." 6 His concern that a state should
be permitted to control the flow of its largess led Justice Stevens to
agree with the majority that state-created commerce should be ex-
empt from traditional dormant commerce clause analysis.
In addition to exempting certain state activity from the scope
of the dormant commerce clause, Justice Stevens has indicated a
reluctance to invalidate state legislation clearly subject to dormant
commerce clause scrutiny. By requiring an especially great burden
or discriminatory effect on interstate commerce before invalidating
state legislation, Justice Stevens has limited further the impact of
the unexercised commerce power on such legislation. In Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,7 for example, Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the Court, upheld the constitutionality of a Maryland statute
that prohibited a producer or refiner of petroleum products from
operating any retail service station within the state." Several major
petroleum refiners challenged the statute's validity under the dor-
mant commerce clause on two grounds: first, that the statute dis-
criminated against interstate commerce by protecting independent
Maryland retailers from competition with interstate petroleum refi-
ners, and second, that the statute, by causing three major oil refi-
ners to stop selling in Maryland, even at the wholesale level, imper-
missibly burdened interstate commerce.
Justice Stevens rejected both contentions. First, Stevens stated
that the fact that the burden of the statute's divestiture require-
ments fell solely on interstate companies did not necessitate a con-
clusion that the state was discriminating against interstate com-
15. Id. at 815 (Stevens, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 817.
17. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
18. The statute provided:
After July 1, 1974, no producer or refiner of petroleum products shall open a major brand,
secondary brand or unbranded retail service station in the State of Maryland, and
operate it with company personnel, a subsidiary company, commissioned agent, or under
contract with any person, firm, or corporation, managing a service station on a fee
arrangement with the producer or refiner. The station must be operated by a retail
service station dealer.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(b) (Supp. 1978).
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merce."1 He pointed to several interstate petroleum marketers that
were unaffected by the statute because they did not produce or
refine petroleum. Second, Justice Stevens stated that the with-
drawal of several petroleum refiners from the Maryland wholesale
market did not necessarily constitute an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce since "there is no reason to assume that their
share of the entire supply will not be promptly replaced by other
interstate refiners."20 In addition, Justice Stevens found that the
injury to the consuming public resulting from the loss of high vol-
ume, low-priced retail stations operated by major oil refiners related
only "to the wisdom of the statute, not to its burden on com-
merce." 21
Justice Stevens has also refused to employ the dormant com-
merce clause analysis to impose uniformity on the states with re-
spect to state taxation of interstate business despite his admission
that such uniformity would "advance the policies that underlie the
Commerce Clause."2 Writing for the Court in Moorman Manufac-
turing Co. v. Bair,2 Justice Stevens upheld an Iowa statute pre-
scribing the use of a "single-factor sales formula" in apportioning
an interstate corporation's income for state income tax purposes. 24
Most states utilize a three-factor formula. Even though duplicative
taxation significantly burdening interstate commerce could result
from use of the different formulas by the various states, Justice
Stevens declined to hold that the commerce clause, in the absence
of congressional action, requires the use of a uniform formula simply
because a majority of the states have chosen identical formulas.
According to Justice Stevens, an imposition of uniformity on the
states would require a "policy decision based on political and eco-
nomic considerations that vary from State to State," and the exclu-
sion of "the interests of those States whose policies are subordinated
in the quest for uniformity . . . .
Justice Stevens' reluctance to utilize the dormant commerce
clause to invalidate state legislation is of great importance in deter-
mining the direction of the Supreme Court as it seeks to maintain
19. 437 U.S. at 126.
20. Id. at 127.
21. Id. at 128.
22. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 279 (1978).
23. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
24. Id. at 267-81. The single-factor formula results in tax on a percentage of the corpora-
tion's income equal to the ratio of gross in-state sales to total gross sales by the corporation.
The three-factor formula utilizes three ratios: property within the state to total property,
payroll within the state to total payroll, and sales within the state to total sales. Id. at 270
n.3.
25. Id. at 279-80.
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the balance between state and federal power. When faced with a
challenge to state legislation under the dormant commerce clause,
Justice Stevens consistently joins Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist in upholding state autonomy.2 Justice Stevens' opinions
in Alexandria Scrap, Exxon, and Moorman suggest that his reluct-
ance to use the dormant commerce clause is based upon two con-
cerns that mandate independent action by the states. The first con-
cern is the theoretical benefit that a federal system obtains by en-
couraging experimentation among its various entities. In his con-
currence in Alexandria Scrap, Justice Stevens was mindful of the
necessity of such experimentation, especially in the area of state-
subsidized incentives to business. The second concern is the benefit
that a federal system derives from allocating to local government
the accomodation of local interests and the solution of local prob-
lems. In Moorman Justice Stevens expressed particular concern for
"political and economic considerations that vary from State to
State."" Thus, when state legislation is subjected to a dormant
commerce clause challenge, these concerns motivate Justice Ste-
vens to rule consistently in favor of state autonomy.
C. The Scope of the Affirmative Commerce Power
Justice Stevens' concern for state autonomy in the dormant
commerce clause cases is tempered by his recognition of the broad
scope of congressional authority under the affirmative aspect of the
commerce clause. This recognition establishes that Justice Stevens
is cognizant of the necessity for a balance between state and federal
power and has resulted in his separation from the Burger-Rehnquist
states' rights alliance.
Justice Stevens' most conspicuous departure from states' rights
advocacy occurred in National League of Cities v. Usery," in which
the Court declared minimum wage and maximum hour provisions
established by the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act" unconstitutional as applied to state government employees
performing "traditional governmental functions.""0 Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, expressed particular concern over the
states' role as "coordinate element[s] in the system established by
the Framers for governing our Federal Union."" Thus, the majority
held that Congress was without authority under the commerce
26. See note 7 supra.
27. 437 U.S. at 279.
28. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
29. 29 U.S.C. H§ 201-219 (1976).
30. 426 U.S. at 852.
31. Id. at 849.
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clause to "wield its power in a fashion that would impair the States'
'ability to function effectively in a federal system.' "2
Despite his "disagreement with the wisdom of [the] legisla-
tion,"" Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's holding, assert-
ing that the federal government's power over the labor market is
adequate to embrace state government employees." Justice Stevens
thus did not view the issues presented by Usery within the frame-
work of state autonomy or states' rights adopted by Justice Rehnqu-
ist. Rather Justice Stevens focused solely on the scope of the affirm-
ative grant of federal power established by the Constitution in the
commerce clause. Recognition of the need for uniform national
treatment of labor markets led Justice Stevens to find adequate
authority for federally imposed wage and hour standards in the
commerce clause, even when such provisions are applied to state
government employees.
This approach again demonstrates Justice Stevens' concern for
a balance between state and federal authority. In the affirmative
commerce power context, unlike the dormant commerce clause
cases, Justice Stevens must assess the proper scope of exercised
federal power. Just as he consistently defers to state legislation af-
fecting interstate commerce in the absence of congressional action,
Justice Stevens seeks to uphold the exercise of the commerce power
by Congress, even when restrictions are imposed on the activities of
a "State qua State."" Justice Stevens' unwillingness to subordinate
the impact of federal legislation to traditional state concerns in
Usery indicates deference toward congressional policy decisions
imposing uniformity on the states. The Usery dissent does not indi-
cate whether Justice Stevens would impose any limits on congres-
sional policy decisions regarding the need for national uniformity or
whether he would consistently defer to a legislative determination
that uniformity was necessary. It is certain, however, that Justice
Stevens, contrary to the majority assembled by the Burger-
Rehnquist alliance, is reluctant to impose state sovereignty as such
a limit.
D. The Scope of Federal Legislation
Justice Stevens has recognized the plenary federal power under
the commerce clause and has justified state legislation affecting
32. Id. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
33. Id. at 881.
34. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his concurrence in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976), Stevens again stated that "the commerce power is broad enough to support federal
legislation regulating the terms and conditions of state employment." 427 U.S. at 458.
35. 426 U.S. at 881.
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interstate commerce in the face of dormant commerce clause chal-
lenges. Although his decisions in these two areas seem to represent
a balancing of state and federal power, in neither context does Jus-
tice Stevens confront conflicting policy decisions made by the fed-
eral and state governments. In cases of direct conflict between state
and federal interests arising under the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution, Justice Stevens has had more difficulty
achieving a balance.
(1) Federal Preemption
Generally, the supremacy clause"6 provides that federal legisla-
tion shall supersede that of the states if the federal regulation is "so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it" or touches "a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same sub-
ject.""7 The determination whether a federal law is sufficiently
"'pervasive" or a federal interest sufficiently "dominant" to preempt
state legislation necessarily requires consideration of competing
state and federal interests.
In the preemption context, the weight given to state interests
by Justice Stevens seems to depend upon his perception of the need
for national uniformity in the area or activities regulated by the
conflicting federal and state legislation.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council
of Carpenters8 the Court considered the effect of the National Labor
Relations Act 39 upon state court power to enforce state trespass laws
against picketing that is arguably prohibited or protected by sec-
tions 7 and 8 of the Act." Normally, conduct arguably covered by
the Act is subject only to the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board and state courts must defer to its exclusive jurisdic-
tion." Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, refused
to adopt "an approach which sweeps away state-court jurisdiction
36. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
37. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
38. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
40. Sears sought an injunction on the state law grounds of trespass when a carpenters'
union, after discovering that carpentry work in a Sears store was being done by nonunion
workers, established picket lines on Sears' property.
41. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
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over conduct traditionally subject to state regulation without care-
ful consideration of the relative impact of such a jurisdictional bar
on the various interests affected." 2 Justice Stevens stated that in
the absence of compelling congressional direction, the Court would
uphold state court jurisdiction under the trespass laws because the
conduct thus regulated touched "interests . . . deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility . . . ."3 Justice Stevens considered
two factors in evaluating this preemption challenge: first, the signif-
icance of the state interest in protecting its citizens from the con-
duct in question, and second, the degree of risk of interference with
the regulatory jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
entailed by the exercise of state court jurisdiction." Justice Stevens'
willingness to consider such factors demonstrates his concern that
responsibility for solving local problems be allocated to local govern-
ment unless explicit federal policy compels otherwise.
Similarly, in Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission" Justice Stevens argued in dissent that state law could
legitimately declare conduct to be an unfair labor practice even
though it is neither protected nor prohibited by the National Labor
Relations Act." This dissent, coupled with the Sears decision,
clearly indicates that Justice Stevens does not regard the Act as
sufficiently pervasive, nor the federal interest in regulating labor
relations sufficiently dominant, to preempt all state action in the
area.
This analysis stands in marked contrast to that utilized by
Justice Stevens in the antitrust area. 7 While the cases he has de-
cided in this area do not focus on traditional preemption issues,
Justice Stevens has clearly discounted the concern he expressed in
the labor relations context for state control over local matters in
determining the effect of the Sherman Act" on state legislation and
judicial actions. In Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp." the Court
42. 436 U.S. at 188.
43. Id. at 195 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(1959)).
44. 436 U.S. at 196.
45. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
46. Id. at 156-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The conduct complained of consisted of union
refusal to work overtime during negotiations for renewal of an expired collective bargaining
agreement.
47. Justice Stevens possesses considerable expertise in the antitrust area. Prior to his
appointment to the Seventh Circuit, he was associate counsel to the House of Representatives
subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power, a member of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, and a lecturer in antitrust law at Northwestern and
University of Chicago Law Schools. Special Project, supra note 2, at 169-70.
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
49. 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
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reviewed a district court decision enjoining collection of an Illinois
state court judgment. Petitioner had successfully sued respondent
in state court for breach of certain noncompetitive covenants. Res-
pondent alleged, in federal court, that the covenants violated the
Sherman Act. The Court held that the Clayton Act," which author-
izes injunctive relief for Sherman Act violations, provided no ex-
emption from the Anti-Injunction Act,51 which prohibits a federal
court from enjoining state-court proceedings unless expressly au-
thorized by Congress. Justice Stevens, dissenting, refused to deprive
"the federal courts of power to stay state-court litigation which is
being prosecuted in direct violation of the Sherman Act," 2 reason-
ing that the prosecution of litigation in a state court may itself
constitute a form of violation of the federal statute."3 Moreover,
Justice Stevens expressly declined to "invoke principles of federal-
ism to defeat enforcement of the 'Magna Charta of free enterprise'
enacted pursuant to Congress' plenary power to regulate commerce
among the States.""
Justice Stevens has also declined to broaden the scope of the
Parker v. Brown"5 doctrine, which exempts states from antitrust
liability under the Sherman Act. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,"*
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, refused to apply Parker to
a state-regulated private utility that was required by state law to
carry on a free light bulb exchange program with its residential
customers, an activity that arguably violated the Sherman Act.
Justice Stevens refused to hold private conduct required by state
law exempt from the provisions of the Sherman Act even in areas
of the economy pervasively regulated by state agencies prior to en-
actment of federal antitrust legislation.
Although limited to the labor relations and antitrust contexts,
the crucial factor in Justice Stevens' preemption analysis appears
to be his perception whether the area regulated by Congress de-
mands national uniformity. As Lodge 76 suggests, Justice Stevens
perceives a strong local interest in regulating certain aspects of the
employer-employee relationship, thus limiting the preemptive ef-
fect of the National Labor Relations Act. In the antitrust area, on
the other hand, Justice Stevens concludes that insuring free enter-
prise in the national economy is a vital federal interest, which nar-
50. 15 U.S.C. H§ 12-27 (1976).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
52. 433 U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 652.
54. Id. at 666.
55. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
56. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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rows the extent of permissible state regulation. Justice Stevens'
perception of the need for pervasive antitrust legislation thus results
in his unwillingness to subordinate this federal concern to any state
interest.
(2) Sovereign Immunity
Since McCulloch v. Maryland57 the supremacy clause has im-
munized the federal government from direct taxation by the states.
This immunity, however, does not extend to taxes "indirectly" laid
on the federal government unless such taxes are discriminatory.
Thus, for example, a state tax imposed solely on the income of
federal employees residing within a state is invalid under the su-
premacy clause, but the clause does not invalidate a state income
tax imposed nondiscriminately Qn all state residents, even though
federal employees are also subject to state taxation."8
Justice Stevens demonstrated great concern for the preserva-
tion of federal immunity from state taxation in United States v.
County of Fresno."9 In that case, California law authorized counties
to impose an annual tax on possessory interests in improvements on
tax-exempt property. The counties levied a tax on United States
Forest Service employees for their possessory interests in housing
supplied by the United States and located in national forests. The
majority of the Court upheld the assessment, reasoning that the tax
was not discriminatory since the counties imposed a similar tax on
nonexempt property. Justice Stevens, dissenting alone, rejected the
reasoning of the majority and found the tax to be discriminatory
because the California counties imposed no tax on other types of
tax-exempt property within the state. Justice Stevens described the
tax as one which created "the kind of potential for friction between
two sovereigns that the doctrine of constitutional immunity was
intended to avoid."60
The sovereign immunity context, however, also has presented
Justice Stevens the opportunity to express sensitivity to potential
infringements upon state interests by the federal government. In
Minnesota v. Alexander" the Court refused to hear an appeal of a
lower court holding that dredging by the Army Corps of Engineers
was exempt from state water pollution regulations. Justice Stevens,
arguing vigorously for review of the lower court decision, recognized
the general rule that federal agencies are immune from state regula-
57. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 160 (1819).
58. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
59. 429 U.S. 452 (1977).
60. Id. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
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tion," but asserted that Congress had waived the immunity in sec-
tion 313 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act." Justice Ste-
vens contended that review of the issues was particularly important
in light of both the damage done to Minnesota water quality by
Corps of Engineers activities and the concern expressed by six other
states, which filed briefs urging reversal of the lower court decision."
Justice Stevens' decisions in the sovereign immunity context
suggest considerable concern for the federal government's ability to
operate free from interference by the states. Stevens' sole dissent in
Fresno emphasizes his distinctive sensitivity in this area. As his
Alexander dissent indicates, however, Justice Stevens also is willing
to allow such state interference should Congress choose to waive.
sovereign immunity. Justice Stevens may require an express con-
gressional waiver of immunity to overcome his apparent presump-
tion that federal sovereignty, broadly defined, must always prevail
over restrictive state legislation.
E. Conclusion
Justice Stevens' opinions addressing allocation of lawmaking
powers between state and federal government suggest that he holds
in high regard the federalism principles set forth in the Constitu-
tion. Utilizing the varied constitutional contexts in which balance
of power issues arise, Justice Stevens manifests this concern by
insuring that both state and federal interests receive due considera-
tion. In the commerce clause context, Justice Stevens is consistently
reluctant to invalidate state legislation affecting interstate com-
merce on dormant commerce clause grounds, thereby enabling the
states to experiment in resolving problems affecting local interests.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens recognizes the plenary nature of the
affirmative federal commerce power mandated by the need for na-
tional uniformity in certain matters. Thus, Justice Stevens is gener-
ally willing to accept the fact of congressional action as indicating
a need for such uniformity. In the supremacy clause context, Justice
Stevens demonstrates a willingness to uphold state activity based
on legitimate state interests in areas in which Congress has legis-
lated, but he has refused to subordinate important federal interests,
such as antitrust legislation, to even the most significant and tradi-
tional state interests.
Most importantly, in his three Terms on the Supreme Court,
Justice Stevens has maintained an ideological independence, adher-
ing to neither a rigid states' rights philosophy nor a belief that
62. Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1976).
64. 430 U.S. at 980.
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federal power must always prevail. This independence has resulted
in decisions based on logic and reason, with a consistent and reason-
able application of constitutional principles. His opinions, in turn,
have contributed significantly to maintaining a balance between
state and national power necessary for the successful operation of a
federal system of government.
m. INmvmUAL RIGHTS
A. The Constitutional Rights of the Accused Criminal
(1) Analytical Approach: "Due Process" vs. "Crime Control"
In The Limits of the Criminal Sanction," Herbert L. Packer
offers a dichotomous approach to analyzing the criminal process. At
the heart of Professor Packer's methodology are two models, labeled
the Due Process Model and the Crime Control Model, which de-
scribe conflicting value judgments made in administering the crimi-
nal process." This section of the Special Project employs Professor
Packer's models to characterize Justice Stevens' opinions relating
to the rights of the criminal defendant. First, the basic philosophy
of each model must be summarized briefly."
Stated in grossest terms, the principal concern of the Due Pro-
cess Model is to guard the rights of the individual criminal defen-
dant. The philosophy of the Due Process Model has four premises:
first, the criminal process culminates in the loss of substantial liber-
ties and the attachment of social stigma; second, the criminal pro-
cess is prone to human error; third, the criminal process usually
operates unequally, depending upon the financial resources of the
defendant; and fourth, the morality and effectiveness of traditional
criminal sanctions are dubious." The Due Process Model thus de-
mands that the criminal defendant be assured every available ad-
vantage in the criminal process, placing significant emphasis on the
presumption of innocence. The chief concern of the Due Process
approach is not with a defendant's factual guilt; rather, the main
issue is whether proof of guilt is established in accordance with the
rules governing the criminal process. Thus considerations of effi-
ciency and the societal interest in controlling the criminal element
are decidedly subordinate under the Due Process view.
In contrast to the Due Process Model, the Crime Control Model
rests upon the proposition that the primary concern of the criminal
65. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANMCON (1968).
66. Id. at 152-54.
67. This summary only describes the basic elements of each model. For a full develop-
ment of Professor Packer's mode of analysis, see id. at 149-73.
68. Id. at 163-73.
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process is to discourage criminal conduct." Contending that an
effective criminal process is essential to maintaining an ordered
society," the Crime Control view places the interests of the criminal
defendant secondary to those of society. Efficiency is the goal under
the Crime Control approach: the success of the criminal process
depends upon not only the speed with which a criminal is appre-
hended and convicted, but also the number of individuals who move
through the process.71 Thus a less formal and more uniform criminal
process is a more efficient system: a process with fewer formalities
provides fewer procedural rules offering advantages to the criminal
defendant, and greater uniformity results in less regard for the
unique circumstances of a case or the particular needs of a defen-
dant.72
To attain maximum efficiency in the criminal process, those
cases having a low probability of producing a conviction must be
rejected at the earliest stage possible. Theoretically, then, under the
Crime Control approach the criminal process operates upon the
probability or confidence that the defendant is guilty.73 Thus, while
the Due Process Model uses procedural safeguards to prevent injus-
tice in the criminal process, the Crime Control Model relies upon
its fact-finding process to avoid erroneous conviction, giving the
defendant the benefit of the doubt at the earliest stages of the crimi-
nal process.
The utility of Packer's dual model notion in analyzing Justice
Stevens' opinions lies not in labeling him as either a Due Process
or Crime Control advocate,74 or as having a strong pro-defendant or
pro-prosecution orientation, but in using the premises underlying
the models to identify his principal concerns when the criminal
process is invoked against an individual. In attempting to isolate
these concerns, this section of the Special Project examines Justice
Stevens' opinions75 concerning three basic stages of the criminal
process: the pretrial, trial, and post-conviction periods.
69. Id. at 158.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 159.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 160-61.
74. Because the two models represent theoretical absolutes, one would hardly expect
to find that Justice Stevens-or any other person-is either a Due Process or Crime Control
purist; indeed, Professor Packer labels the purist a "fanatic". Id. at 154.
75. Of the 31 criminal cases in which Justice Stevens wrote opinions during his first
three Terms on the Court, he delivered the majority opinion in only five.
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(2) The Criminal Process
(a) The Pretrial Context
Collectively, Justice Stevens' opinions in cases centering upon
issues arising at the pretrial stage indicate that he seeks to assure
the full operation of the constitutional guarantees designed to pro-
tect the criminal defendant, even in the face of a defendant's ob-
vious factual guilt. For example, in Brewer v. Williams,78 defendant,
an escaped mental patient, was convicted of murdering a minor
female. Although defendant's factual guilt was beyond dispute,7
Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's five to four decision over-
turning the conviction on the ground that he had been denied right
to counsel .7 Emphasizing the difficulty in deciding the case dispas-
sionately, 9 he nonetheless concluded that in coercing evidence from
defendant before he had the opportunity to consult with counsel, 0
the authorities thus deprived defendant of his right to counsel at a
"critical stage."8'
In cases raising fourth amendment search and seizure issues,
Justice Stevens consistently demonstrates a sensitivity to the indi-
vidual's interest in freedom from unjustified intrusions by law en-
forcement officers. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms" Justice Stevens dis-
sented from a per curiam decision permitting police to search mo-
torists stopped for routine traffic violations. Although recognizing
the threat to policemen's lives in these situations, Justice Stevens
asserted that the Court's decision abandoned a long-established rule
requiring "individualized inquiry into the particular facts justifying
every police intrusion" and authorized "the indiscriminate invasion
of the liberty of every citizen stopped for a traffic violation, no
matter how petty."" Similarly, Justice Stevens dissented in
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 8 in which the Court ruled that a search
warrant may be issued when probable cause exists to believe that
76. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
77. Defendant called his attorney and confessed to the crime and later led police officers
to various locations where articles of the victim's clothing, and the body itself, were found.
Id. at 390-93.
78. Id. at 414-15 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. When defendant called his attorney, the attorney advised him not to make any
statements to the police until after they had had an opportunity to confer. Thereafter, the
police agreed that they would not question the defendant while transporting him. During the
165 mile trip, however, the police, knowing that the defendant was strongly religious, coerced
him into leading them to the evidence by delivering what was termed a "Christian burial
speech." Id. at 391-93.
81. Id. at 415.
82. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
83. Id. at 116, 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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evidence relating to a criminal investigation may be found. He con-
tended that the fourth amendment requires much more than merely
establishing that a search may uncover evidence. 5 Arguing that the
Court's ruling could subject "[c]ountless law abiding citizens"" to
unannounced searches resulting in inspection of confidential mate-
rial unrelated to the investigation," he asserted that the fourth
amendment "flatly prohibits"8 issuance of a warrant without show-
ing probable cause of either participation in a crime or a fear that
evidence may be destroyed."
Justice Stevens did not identify specifically any Due Process
Model values in setting forth his more rigorous probable cause re-
quirements. His dissents in Mimms and Zurcher, however, give rise
to the inference that he relied intuitively upon the second premise
underlying the Due Process Model: the criminal process is prone to
human error." In both cases, his opinions focused upon the egre-
gious consequences to which the Court's rulings might lead-the
abuse of police power that could affect seriously individuals' rights
to privacy and freedom from oppression. Even though Justice Ste-
vens emphasized the interests of the innocent victims, his standards
85. Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 579.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 582.
89. Id. at 582-83. In an earlier case, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976),
Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's decision rejecting respondent's claim that her fourth
amendment rights were violated when police, acting upon the knowledge that she was en-
gaged in heroin trafficking, pursued her into the vestibule of her home to make a warrantless
arrest. Justice Stevens based his concurrence partly upon one of the considerations he later
emphasized in Zurcher: a substantial risk existed that the evidence-in this case, marked
money-might not be in respondent's possession by the time the police obtained a warrant.
Id. at 44-45. Although Santana is distinguishable from Mimms and Zurcher in that it cen-
tered upon a warrantless arrest rather than an unannounced search, the underlying motiva-
tions are identical: Justice Stevens did not allow law enforcement officers to compromise the
warrants clause of the fourth amendment without an "articulable justification" for the intru-
sion. This position was reiterated in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), in which the
Court held that, when police and fire department investigators entered burned premises some
three days after the fire to investigate and secure evidence of arson, such entry without a
warrant violated the warrants clause of the fourth amendment. Concurring, Justice Stevens
stated: "In my view, when there is no probable cause to believe a crime has been committed
and when there is no special enforcement need to justify an unannounced entry, the Fourth
Amendment neither requires nor sanctions an abrupt and peremptory confrontation between
sovereign and citizen." Id. at 513-14 (Stevens, J., concurring).
These cases must be distinguished, however, from Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978), in which Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's decision applying the fourth
amendment protections to inspections by administrative agencies that are conducted to
investigate compliance with federal statutes, in this case, OSHA. Contending that these
inspections were adopted by Congress pursuant to its recognition of a federal interest in
safety, Justice Stevens concluded that the Court should have deferred to congressional judg-
ment. Id. at 325-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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would simultaneously protect those factually connected with crimi-
nal misconduct. Justice Stevens' willingness to accept the release of
some factually guilty individuals in order to reduce the potential for
infringement upon individual rights resulting from police error dis-
tinguishes him from the majority of the Supreme Court.
(b) The Trial Context
Consistent with his opinions in the pretrial context, Justice
Stevens' opinions in cases containing issues relating to the trial
process indicate that he seeks to ensure the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants. For example, in Lakeside v. Oregon" Justice
Stevens dissented from the Court's rejection of petitioner's claim
that the trial court's instructions cautioning the jury not to draw
adverse inferences from petitioner's failure to testify violated the
fifth amendment prohibition of self-incrimination. Justice Stevens
opened his dissent by alluding to a central Crime Control presump-
tion: "Experience teaches us that most people formally charged
with a crime are guilty . . . . Experience also justifies the inference
that most people who remain silent in the face of serious accusation
have something to hide and are therefore probably guilty . . . ."I2
Nonetheless, Justice Stevens endorsed the Due Process premise that
the criminal process is prone to human error, stating that the pur-
pose of the self-incrimination provision was to protect "a small mi-
nority of accused persons-those who are actually innocent-from
wrongful conviction." 3 Accordingly, he concluded that the instruc-
tion, even though intended to have an ameliorative effect, violated
the protection against self-incrimination."
91. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
92. Id. at 342 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 343.
94. Id. at 347-48. In Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977), Justice Stevens delivered
the majority opinion upholding respondent's second degree murder conviction over his chal-
lenge that the trial judge failed to give adequate instructions regarding the causation element
of the offense. Noting that respondent had a greater burden of showing unconstitutional
prejudice in a collateral proceeding than on direct appeal, Justice Stevens stated that, in
order to overturn the conviction, the instructions must have "so infected the entire trial that
the resulting conviction violates due process." Id. at 154 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.
141, 147 (1973)). Accordingly, upon reviewing the entire record and the instructions given,
Justice Stevens ruled that the jury was adequately informed of the causation element. Kibbe
thus demonstrates Justice Stevens' concern for court efficiency and the integrity of the sys-
tem, but in a different context: in Kibbe he endorses the view that collateral proceedings
place a greater burden upon the defendant. Accordingly, he identified the correct constitu-
tional boundary and concluded that the trial judge's instruction was within it.
In Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978), Justice Stevens dissented from a decision
overturning a conviction on the ground that defendant had the constitutional right to an
instruction on the presumption of innocence if such an instruction was requested. Stating that
an omission in instructing the jury may constitute reversible error if it results in the depriva-
688 [Vol. 32:671
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Justice Stevens again alluded to both Crime Control and Due
Process premises in dissenting from the decision in Ludwig v.
Massachusetts," which upheld the state's two-tier court system,
requiring defendants to submit to a nonjury proceeding before re-
ceiving a jury trial. Conceding the Crime Control consideration that
the two-tier system expedited the disposition of criminal cases,"
Justice Stevens nevertheless indicated greater sensitivity to the
third premise" of the Due Process Model in contending that the
system imposed undue financial, as well as psychological, burdens
upon defendants. 8 Noting that the two-tier system could discourage
a defendant from pursuing his right to a jury trial," Justice Stevens
also argued that the system might prejudice jurors, since they would
probably learn of the conviction or guilty plea in the previous
stage.'"
Although Lakeside and Ludwig demonstrate Justice Stevens'
consistency in affording individuals the full measure of constitu-
tional protections, those cases do not evidence a second trait that
manifests itself in his opinions in cases arising in the trial context.
When the issue centers upon the exercise of discretionary powers by
the trial judge, Justice Stevens defers to the trial court's judgment,
upholding the disputed action unless it is clearly contrary to consti-
tutional principles. This is best exemplified in United States v.
Agurs."o' In Agurs respondent claimed that she was denied a fair
trial because the prosecution failed to disclose evidence voluntarily
tion of a constitutional guarantee, Justice Stevens argued that there is no constitutional
provision requiring the instruction requested in this case, and that therefore no constitutional
error had been committed. Although Justice Stevens did not expand further upon his reason-
ing in this very short opinion, his opinion appears to have focused on the constitutional limits
of judicial power rather than on individual rights or concerns of efficiency: specifically, the
role of the Court as a reviewing body should be limited to the scope afforded by the Constitu-
tion.
95. 427 U.S. 618 (1976).
96. Id. at 635, 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
98. 427 U.S. at 634-35.
99. Id. at 637 n.3.
100. Id. at 637. In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), Justice Stevens delivered
the majority opinion that affirmed the overturning of a second degree murder conviction.
Defendant pleaded guilty at trial without understanding that second degree murder included
an element of intent. The government argued that the Court should not require a "ritualistic
litany of the formal legal elements" to assure the voluntariness of defendant's guilty plea,
but should focus instead upon whether the substance of the charge was conveyed. Id. at 644.
Although agreeing with this contention, Justice Stevens found, however, that even under that
test, the guilty plea was defective. Id. Recognizing that "overwhelming evidence of guilt was
available," Justice Stevens concluded: "Nevertheless, such a plea cannot support a judgment
of guilt unless it was voluntary in the constitutional sense." Id. at 644-45 (footnote omitted).
He noted that a plea cannot be voluntary if the defendant has an incomplete understanding
of the charge. Id. at 645 n.13.
101. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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that would have aided her defense to second degree murder
charges.o2 Justice Stevens, delivering the majority opinion, rejected
her claim because the evidence would have made no material contri-
bution in the decisionmaking process. Recognizing that situations
arise in which evidence is so valuable to a defendant's case that
"elementary fairness" would require the prosecutor to disclose it
without request,"' Justice Stevens established a test for determin-
ing when the Constitution requires such disclosure: "[I]f the omit-
ted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist,
constitutional error has been committed."'"' Applying this test, Jus-
tice Stevens deferred to the judgment of the trial judge, who, con-
vinced that respondent was guilty even after reviewing the omitted
evidence, denied her motion for a new trial.15
Justice Stevens' Agurs opinion may suggest that he emphasizes
Crime Control efficiency values when the issue relates to the discre-
tionary powers of the trial judge. This broad conclusion must be
tempered by acknowledging an apparent distinction between the
efficiency concerns of Justice Stevens and those of the Crime Con-
trol Model. Justice Stevens recognized that the trial judge was the
best-informed decisionmaker available; since he presided over the
trial, he could best determine the relative value of the excluded
evidence. The goal of efficiency under the Crime Control Model, on
the other hand, reflects less regard for the proper allocation of deci-
sionmaking, seeking primarily to speed the process of apprehension
and conviction by reducing procedural formalities.'
Justice Stevens' opinions thus indicate that he has a moderate
approach in cases containing issues related to criminal trial pro-
ceedings. Consistent with his opinions in the pretrial context,
Lakeside and Ludwig demonstrate that he gives greater weight to
Due Process Model values when the criminal process erroneously or
unjustifiably compromises specific constitutional provisions de-
signed to protect the criminal defendant. On the other hand, Justice
Stevens generally defers to the trial courts' discretionary judgments.
Although this deference reflects a concern for the efficiency of the
criminal process-on its face a Crime Control value-Justice Ste-
vens seems to focus primarily on allocating responsibility to the
102. Specifically, respondent contended that the prosecution suppressed the victim's
prior criminal record, which would have evidenced his violent character and aided her claim
of self-defense. Id. at 100.
103. Id. at 110.
104. Id. at 112.
105. Id. at 113-14. See also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978). In Arizona,
Justice Stevens again manifested his deference to the trial court in its decision to declare a
mistrial. See text accompanying notes 117-25 infra.
106. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
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most competent decisionmaker. In Agurs Justice Stevens ascer-
tained the boundaries of constitutional tolerance and satisfied him-
self that the trial courts' findings were within them. Accordingly, he
refused to substitute his judgment for that of the trial court after
determining that the trial judge was best-equipped to make the
necessary judgment. Justice Stevens thus reinforces the integrity of
the criminal justice system by demonstrating confidence in the deci-
sionmaking ability of trial judges.
(c) Double Jeopardy Questions and the Post-Conviction Context
Although the judgment of guilt is perhaps the climactic mo-
ment in the criminal justice process, it certainly is not the terminal
point. Significant constitutional questions may arise concerning
such matters as sentencing, appeals, and double jeopardy. This
subsection examines Justice Stevens' treatment of post-conviction
issues in light of the values associated with the Due Process and
Crime Control Models.
Justice Stevens' opinions in double jeopardy cases demonstrate
consistency and a uniform emphasis on Due Process Model values.
In Jeffers v. United States'07 Justice Stevens ignored defendant's
obvious factual guilt in dissenting from the Court's decision to make
an exception to the double jeopardy rule that an individual cannot
be tried for a crime after conviction on a lesser included offense. The
Court reasoned that since defendant demanded that the two indict-
ments returned against him not be consolidated for trial, he could
not later challenge the second trial as violating the double jeopardy
clause.""n Justice Stevens argued that the Court's ruling required
defendant to inform the prosecution of the legal consequences of its
acts in order to preserve a constitutional right."' He noted that
"[elven the desirability of extending [defendant's] incarceration
does not justify this unique decision." 0
In Jeffers the majority sidestepped the general lesser included
offense rule by holding defendant responsible for the consequences
of his refusal to consolidate indictments for trial; because he taxed
the procedural efficiency of the system-anathema to the Crime
Control Model-defendant effectively waived his right to assert the
double jeopardy bar. By dissenting, Justice Stevens thus indicated
unwillingness to adhere to the fundamental Crime Control Model
proposition that "formalities" should not prevent trial, conviction,
107. 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
108. Id. at 154.
109. Id. at 160 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).




Similarly, in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co."l2 JUS-
tice Stevens concurred in the Court's holding that judgment of ac-
quittal entered by the trial judge pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may not be appealed by the
government under the Criminal Appeals Act."' Justice Stevens re-
viewed the legislative history of the Act and concluded that Con-
gress did not authorize appeals from acquittals because the double
jeopardy clause prohibits such appeals."' Turning to the issue
whether an acquittal entered by the trial judge after declaring a
mistrial is an acquittal for the purposes of the Act, Justice Stevens
stated: "By virtue of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29(c), the mistrial did
not terminate the judge's power to make a decision on the merits.
His ruling, in substance as well as form, was therefore an acquit-
tal."" He refused to construe the Criminal Appeals Act in a manner
that would compromise double jeopardy doctrine, even though the
aquittal resulted from application of federal procedural rules rather
than from a jury verdict. Thus Martin Linen further demonstrates
that Justice Stevens spurns the Crime Control Model's deemphasis
of "formalistic" rules to achieve the societal interest in convicting
those guilty of criminal misconduct. Moreover, by finding that the
trial judge retained his power to determine the merits after declar-
ing a mistrial, Justice Stevens reiterated his confidence in, and
willingness to defer to, the judgment of trial court judges."
In contrast to Jeffers and Martin Linen, Justice Stevens re-
jected respondent's double jeopardy claim in Arizona v.
Washington." During a second trial for murder, respondent's coun-
sel made prejudicial remarks concerning prosecution misconduct
that resulted in a mistrial at the first trial. At this point, the prose-
cution moved for a mistrial, and the trial judge granted the motion.
111. Interestingly, by arguing against permitting the second trial, Justice Stevens ac-
tually advocated a more efficient result than did the majority in terms of resources expended.
112. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
113. FED. R. 0RIM. P. 29(c) states in relevant part: "(c) Motion after Discharge of
Jury: If the jury . . . is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment
of acquittal may be made . . . within 7 days after the jury is discharged . . . . If no verdict
is returned the court may enter judgment of acquittal . . . ."
The Criminal Appeals Act states in relevant part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a
decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information
as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
114. 430 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. Id. (footnote omitted).
116. See text accompanying notes 101-06 supra.
117. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
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To prevent a third trial, respondent sought and was granted a writ
of habeas corpus. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the
trial judge's failure to state in the record that there was a "manifest
necessity" for mistrial or that no alternatives were available to cure
the prejudicial effect of the defense counsel's remarks barred further
prosecution under the double jeopardy clause. The Supreme Court
reversed in a majority opinion written by Justice Stevens. He noted
that retrial was not "automatically barred" by the double jeopardy
clause when final judgment has not been rendered in the first trial."'
In order to secure retrial after a declaration of mistrial, the prosecu-
tor has the "heavy" burden of demonstrating a "manifest necessity"
for seeking a mistrial over defendant's objections."' Justice Stevens
stated that in determining whether this burden had been met, defer-
ence should be given to the trial judge's ruling;2 0 since he presided
over the trial, he was better equipped to gauge the impact of objec-
tionable statements. 2 ' Accordingly, Justice Stevens found that the
trial judge used "sound discretion" in making his ruling, 22 stating,
"in these circumstances, 'the public's interest in fair trials designed
to end in just judgments' must prevail over the defendant's 'valued
right' to have his trial concluded before the first jury impaneled." 2 3
In conclusion, Justice Stevens stated that the Ninth Circuit erred
in basing their decision merely upon the absence of particularized
language in the trial judge's order. 24
The Arizona opinion thus underscores Justice Stevens' willing-
ness to defer to the judgment of the trial court on questions requir-
ing the exercise of judicial discretion. Of more value, however, is
Justice Stevens' assertion of the public interest in full adjudication
of criminal matters. On the surface, his statement indicates that he
rejects using the formalities of the criminal process as a means of
evading a full and final determination of guilt or innocence-a view
closely parallel to the Crime Control Model's interest in reducing
formalities to achieve a greater number of convictions and thus a
more effective criminal process.'" Closer analysis tempers such a
conclusion. By advocating final adjudication of criminal matters,
Justice Stevens implicitly recognized that society is more receptive
to an individual who left the criminal process pursuant to acquittal,
rather than by means of a "technicality." Final adjudication can
118. Id. at 505.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 509-11.
121. Id. at 513-14.
122. Id. at 516.
123. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1948)).
124. 434 U.S. at 516.
125. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
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vindicate as well as condemn a defendant. Essentially, Justice Ste-
vens' statement in Arizona v. Washington should be interpreted as
representing his perception of what society requires of the criminal
process: the goal should not necessarily be to obtain a conviction,
but to provide for a complete process, which at some point resolves
the crucial question of guilt or innocence.
Justice Stevens' opinions in cases relating to challenges to post-
conviction procedures further exemplify his concern that the indi-
vidual receive the full effect of the protections available to him. In
Gardner v. Florida2 6 he delivered the majority opinion vacating
petitioner's death sentence. After petitioner's conviction for first
degree murder, the trial judge imposed the death penalty, relying
in part upon a presentence investigation report furnished by the
Florida Parole and Probation Commission."2 The trial judge fur-
nished part of the report to petitioner, but retained portions that he
deemed confidential.1" Without access to the confidential portions
of the report, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the sentence.'29
Stating that "[iut is of vital importance to the defendant and to
the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be,
and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emo-
tion,""" Justice Stevens held that petitioner had been denied due
process because he had no opportunity to challenge the confidential
portion of the report.13 ' In Gardner Justice Stevens thus implicitly
endorsed the Due Process Model premise that the criminal process
is prone to human error: 3 2 the confidential portions of the present-
encing report may have contained erroneous or inaccurate informa-
tion that might have influenced the trial judge's decision to impose
the death penalty. Also, Gardner indicates that Justice Stevens
approaches death penalty issues with particular concern. Although
he did not express his own views on the morality of capital punish-
ment, Gardner demonstrates that Justice Stevens is well aware of
the unique and grave consequences special to this sanction.
Finally, Justice Stevens' dissent in United States v.
MacCollum'3 3 offers an interesting mixture of his views on the crimi-
nal process. In MacCollum the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit deci-
sion entitling the indigent respondent to a free transcript so that he
could attempt to prove that his counsel at trial had been ineffective.
126. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
127. Id. at 353.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 354.
130. Id. at 358.
131. Id. at 362.
132. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
133. 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
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The Court held that respondent was not constitutionally entitled to
a free transcript to facilitate his habeas corpus claim and that 28
U.S.C. § 753(f) allowed the district judge to refuse to furnish a
free transcript if he found the claim frivolous.' In dissent, Justice
Stevens questioned the ability of a district judge to resolve the
frivolity issue accurately without the aid of a transcript.'" More-
over, he contended that since some district judges routinely order
transcripts while others do not, the adequacy of review of a defen-
dant's claim depends upon the "fortuitous circumstance" of which
judge is assigned to hear the case.'" Justice Stevens bolstered his
argument by stating that a ruling in respondent's favor would im-
prove the efficiency of the system, as prosecutors would then rou-
tinely order transcripts at the conclusion of a criminal proceeding,
thereby avoiding delay in disposing of post-conviction challenges.13 1
In MacCollum federal law allocated the determination of the frivol-
ity of petitioner's collateral attack on his conviction'3 1 to the federal
district courts. By advocating that transcripts be provided, Justice
Stevens sought to assure that the district judges had sufficient infor-
mation to make this determination accurately. Thus, in an effort to
maintain the viability of post-conviction remedies, Justice Stevens
simultaneously sought to strengthen the integrity and credibility of
the post-conviction criminal decisionmaking process.'3 1 Moreover,
Justice Stevens' efficiency concern in MacCollum is again distin-
guishable from that of the Crime Control Model. While the Crime
Control Model favors swift justice and maximization of convictions,
Justice Stevens' attempt to eliminate delay by providing transcripts
simultaneously benefits the individual challenging his conviction.
(3) Conclusion
As indicated at the beginning of this section of the Special
Project, categorizing Justice Stevens as an advocate of either the
Due Process or Crime Control Model would not be accurate or fruit-
ful."' Justice Stevens' opinions do indicate, however, a sensitivity
to the values underlying the Due Process Model. In each stage of the
134. 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (1976) states in relevant part:
Fees for transcripts furnished in proceedings brought under section 2255 of this title to
persons permitted to sue or appeal in forma pauperis shall be paid by the United States
. . . if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the suit or appeal is not frivolous
and that the transcript is needed to decide the issue presented by the suit or appeal.
135. 426 U.S. at 336-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 337.
137. Id. at 338.
138. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
139. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
140. See note 74 supra.
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criminal justice process, he requires close adherence to procedural
rules and demands that the individual be assured the full operation
of every available constitutional protection. When these protections
are compromised, Justice Stevens is willing to overlook the obvious
factual guilt of a particular defendant to achieve the necessary pro-
phylactic effect.
Nevertheless, his consistently strong pro-individual rights ori-
entation must be viewed in the context of his equally significant
concern that the criminal justice system operate in an efficient man-
ner. Although the efficiency of the system is a significant aspect of
the Crime Control Model, Justice Stevens' efficiency concern does
not reflect a propensity to reduce the formality of the process in
order to speed and to increase the number of apprehensions and
convictions. Justice Stevens strives to improve the efficiency of the
process by deferring to the judgment of the best-informed decision-
maker-generally the trial court-on questions of fact and discre-
tion. Moreover, he seeks to assure that the designated decision-
maker has sufficient information to make an accurate judgment.
Thus his concern for the efficiency of the criminal process does not
operate to the particular benefit of either the individual or the state;
instead, Justice Stevens endeavors to enhance the integrity and
credibility of the system itself.
B. First Amendment Rights
During his first three Terms on the Court, Justice Stevens
wrote fourteen opinions relating to the various provisions of the first
amendment. Seven of these dealt with obscenity, two each with free
press and free speech, and three with the establishment clause.
Throughout this broad range of cases, Justice Stevens' opinions
reveal a profound concern that the provisions of the first amend-
ment be strictly construed, lest they suffer gradual erosion through
limitations and exceptions. Justice Stevens' literal interpretation of
the first amendment thus reflects his consistently strong pro-
individual rights posture.
(1) Free Expression
The crucial factor in Justice Stevens' analysis of challenges to
governmental attempts to regulate obscenity is the nature of the
regulation. Generally, if a case arises in the context of a criminal
prosecution he can be expected to vote for reversal of the conviction,
usually in a dissent from the majority's affirmance. On the other
hand, his opinions reveal a willingness to confer constitutional legit-
imacy on noncriminal methods of regulation, and in such cases, he
often writes for the majority. Justice Stevens does not hide his per-
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sonal distaste for the subject matter of the material regulated in
these cases;'"' he simply doubts the wisdom and fairness of using
criminal penalties to control expression at least arguably entitled to
constitutional protection.14 2
Justice Stevens set forth his major objections to the use of
criminal sanctions to regulate obscenity in Ward v. Illinois.4 3 In
Ward the majority affirmed a conviction under a state law prohibit-
ing the distribution of obscene material, finding that the statute
met the requirements established in Miller v. California.'"I Justice
Stevens' dissent argued that the statute was not sufficiently specific
to comport with Miller, even in view of his general objection to "the
inherent vagueness of the obscenity concept." 5 His specific disa-
greement with the definition of obscenity set out in Miller focused
on his fear that because geographic boundaries are not easily de-
fined, the "community standard" may be adjusted to fit the needs
of the prosecutor. In addition, he urged that in order to avoid the
unfair vagueness of most obscenity statutes, the Court should re-
quire that the laws contain an exhaustive list describing prohibited
conduct."'
Justice Stevens' criticism of the lack of a uniform standard
defining what is obscene was also evident in Smith v. United
141. "However distasteful these materials are to some of us, they are nevertheless a
form of communication and entertainment acceptable to a substantial segment of society
. . . ." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens has no reservations about expressing his distaste: "But
few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to
see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). See also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct.
3026 (1978). Not unexpectedly, other members of the Court have criticized these statements.
See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 86 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
142. "In my judgment, the line between communications which 'offend' and those
which do not is too blurred to identify criminal conduct. It is also too blurred to delimit the
protections of the First Amendment." Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Justice Stevens appears determined to dissent from the
Court's approval of criminal penalties in obscenity cases, he also seems resigned to the fact
that the other Justices will not join him: "If the Court were prepared to re-examine this area
of the law, I would vote to reverse this conviction with instructions to dismiss the indictment
. . . . But my views are not now the law." Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 305 (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
143. 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
144. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person,
applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
Id. at 24.
145. 431 U.S. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 781-82.
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States,' in which the Court affirmed defendant's conviction under
a federal statute prohibiting the use of the mails to transport ob-
scene material.'# Justice Stevens' dissent maintained that vague
laws and uncertain standards, and jury instructions based upon
them, are effectively unreviewable by an appellate court."' Simi-
larly, in Marks v. United States,' defendant was convicted of
transporting obscene material in interstate commerce." Again, Jus-
tice Stevens voted for reversal of the conviction because the
"intolerably vague" constitutional standards made evenhanded en-
forcement of the law a virtual impossibility. 52
Thus Justice Stevens' dissents in these criminal cases consis-
tently cite the lack of a uniformly administered national standard
as the principal reason for questioning the suitability of using crimi-
nal prosecutions to regulate the distribution of erotic material.13 His
concern is that the vagueness of the laws under which prosecutions
are initiated and the absence of definite standards for the determi-
nation of what is obscene combine to give the prosecutor an unfair
advantage54 and fail to give sufficient notice of prohibited forms of
expression and content.'55 Justice Stevens thus evinces a reluctance
to allow local prosecutors and juries to delineate the parameters of
constitutionally protected expression when potential criminal sanc-
tions threaten an individual's liberty.
Justice Stevens' view that criminal prosecutions are an inap-
propriate method of abating what is essentially a public nuisance
"entitled to at least a modicum of First Amendment protection""
147. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
148. Defendant was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976), which provided for
a fine and/or imprisonment of anyone who uses the mails to deliver any "obscene, lewd,
lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device or substance . . . ."
149. 431 U.S. at 315-16 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). "How, for example, can an
appellate court intelligently determine whether a jury has properly identified the relevant
community standards?" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 n.* (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 602 (1977)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
151. Defendants were charged with transporting obscene materials in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1465 (1976) and with conspiring to transport such materials in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1976).
152. 430 U.S. at 198. The Court overturned the conviction, holding that the due process
clause of the fifth amendment precludes retroactive application of obscenity standards that
were enunciated after defendant's indictment. Id. at 196. Justice Stevens concurred with the
holding, but objected to the remand for a new trial. Id. at 197.
153. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 313 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. See, e.g., id. at 314-15.
155. See, e.g., Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 780-81 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 312 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also




is consistent with his preference for controlling obscenity through
civil proceedings. In Smith he explicitly recognized this crucial dis-
tinction: "Nuisances such as . . . erotic displays in a residential
area may be abated under appropriately flexible civil standards
even though the First Amendment provides a shield against crimi-
nal prosecution."' 7 Thus, in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc."' and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 15 Justice Stevens' opinions
for the majority sustained the constitutionality of noncriminal laws
and proceedings aimed at the regulation of obscenity. In Young
Justice Stevens upheld a zoning ordinance that specified the loca-
tion of adult theatres on the basis of the content of the films
shown:'
Since what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limitation on the place
where adult films may be exhibited, even though the determination of whether
a particular film fits that characterization turns on the nature of its content,
we conclude that the city's interest in the present and future character of its
neighborhoods adequately supports its classification of motion pictures."'
In Pacifica Foundation Justice Stevens upheld a Federal Communi-
cations Commission finding that a certain radio program was inde-
cent and not suitable for broadcast.6 2 He specifically pointed out
that the Commission had expressed the opinion that patently offen-
sive language should be regulated by principles analogous to those
found in the law of nuisance, which "generally speaks to channeling
behavior more than actually prohibiting it.""'
Justice Stevens is clearly more comfortable with controls on
obscenity that do not include the possibility of incarceration. His
opinions indicate that while he will not countenance laws that
threaten the loss of personal liberty, he will tolerate less repressive
measures aimed at controlling the publication and distribution of
objectionable materials. Thus Justice Stevens' concern with vague-
ness disappears in the context of a civil proceeding, perhaps because
procedural due process considerations of adequate notice are less
157. 431 U.S. at 318 (footnote omitted).
158. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
159. 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978).
160. The ordinance required that adult theatres be dispersed. Specifically, it provided
that an adult theatre could not be located within 1000 feet of any two other regulated uses or
within 500 feet of a residential area. 427 U.S. at 52.
161. Id. at 71-72 (footnote omitted).
162. The Commission had issued a Declaratory Order characterizing a monologue by
comedian George Carlin as "patently offensive," though not necessarily obscene. The Com-
mission banned broadcast of the monologue under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), which prohibits
the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication."
98 S.Ct. at 3030-31.
163. Id. at 3031 (emphasis omitted).
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urgent outside the criminal law."' In Splawn v. California'" Justice
Stevens stated: "Under any sensible regulatory scheme, truthful
description of subject matter that is pleasing to some and offensive
to others ought to be encouraged, not punished. I would not send
[the defendant] to jail for telling the truth about his shabby busi-
ness." 66
Outside of the obscenity context, the two opinions written by
Justice Stevens in the area of free speech examined restrictions
placed on inmates by prison officials. In Procunier v. Navarette,"I
the Court reinstated summary judgment in favor of defendant
officials on plaintiff inmate's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging
defendants' interference with his outside correspondence.'" The
majority ruled that the officials were immune from a section 1983
action unless they knew or should have known that their actions
would violate the prisoner's constitutional rights."' Justice Stevens
dissented on factual grounds, asserting that defendants were not
entitled to summary judgment on the question of immunity from
section 1983 actions because they had not established a good faith
defense. 17 1
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union'7 a union of
prison inmates challenged, as violative of their first amendment
rights, certain regulations of the state Department of Corrections
that prohibited inmates from soliciting others for membership,
barred their meetings, and banned the distribution of union publi-
cations. The Court upheld the restrictions as reasonable, stating
that "an inmate does not retain those First Amendment rights that
are 'inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system.' "172 Justice Stevens
agreed that the restrictions on meetings and publications were per-
missible but argued that the restriction on solicitation was unconsti-
tutional because the department's regulation was too broadly
worded. 73
Thus Justice Stevens' objections to the vagueness of obscenity
164. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 58-61 (1976). See
also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
165. 431 U.S. 595 (1977).
166. Id. at 604 (footnotes omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
168. Specifically, the prisoner charged the officials with failure to mail his correspond-
ence to outsiders, including letters to legal assistance groups, law students, the news media,
other inmates, and personal friends. Id. at 557.
169. Id. at 561-62.
170. Id. at 570-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
172. Id. at 129.
173. Id. at 138-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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laws apply with equal force when a vague or overbroad restriction
threatens the free flow of information not appealing to prurient
interests. Moreover, the Jones dissent indicates the relative strength
of Justice Stevens' commitment to individual rights in that he
found the range of first amendment rights retained by prisoners to
be broader than that described by the majority of the Court.'
(2) Free Press
Justice Stevens' two opinions in the area of free press address
the efforts of the press to interview prisoners and the conflict be-
tween the first amendment right of free press and the sixth amend-
ment right of fair trial. In Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,"' the Court
upheld a sheriff's refusal to allow reporters to inspect a portion of a
county jail in which an inmate had committed suicide against the
reporters' challenge that the refusal violated their first amendment
rights. Relying on its holding in Pell v. Procunier, "I the Court ruled
that "the media has no right, special of access to the Alameda
County Jail different from or greater than that accorded the public
generally.""' In his dissent, Justice Stevens urged that application
of the Pell principle be limited to situations in which the public had
alternative access to adequate information." Otherwise, he main-
tained, the public is denied necessary information about public in-
stitutions, and the process of self-governance, which depends so
heavily upon an enlightened populace, is stripped of its substance.'
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart' the Court struck down a
trial court's "gag order," which had enjoined the press from publish-
ing accounts of confessions, admissions, or other facts strongly im-
plicating defendant in a murder trial, as an impermissible prior
restraint.'8 ' The majority recognized the difficulty in resolving a
conflict between the right of free press and defendant's right to a
fair trial: "if the authors of these guarantees, fully aware of the
potential conflicts between them, were unwilling or unable to re-
174. While sitting on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Stevens expressed
a view of prisoners' first amendment rights consistent with that of his Jones dissent. See
Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335 (1973), affirmed on rehearing en banc, 494 F.2d 85 (7th
Cir. 1974). See also Special Project, supra note 2, at 141-43.
175. 98 S.Ct. 2588 (1978).
176. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). In that case, the Court rejected claims by inmates and news-
men that a state regulation barring face-to-face interviews violated their first amendment
rights, holding that newsmen have "no constitutional right of access to prisons or their
inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Id. at 834.
177. 98 S.Ct. at 2597.
178. Id. at 2607 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2606.
180. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
181. Id. at 570.
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solve the issue by assigning to one priority over the other, it is not
for us to rewrite the Constitution . . . "'I Justice Stevens' concur-
rence stated only that he subscribed to the separate opinion of Jus-
tice Brennan,'" who agreed that a prior restraint on the press is a
constitutionally impermissible method of enforcing the right to a
fair trial, especially if alternative means exist for relieving the ten-
sion between the first and sixth amendments. 84 In the absence of a
prior restraint, however, Justice Brennan concluded that an una-
voidable encroachment upon the right of free press may be permit-
ted.1m
Thus, although the evidence is not extensive, Justice Stevens
seems to attach great importance to the unique role of the press as
a provider of essential information. He seems willing to balance the
right of free press only against other constitutional guarantees, and
to subordinate it to other rights only when absolutely necessary.
(3) The Establishment Clause
Justice Stevens' interpretation of the establishment clause is
unquestionably his most literal in the first amendment area. Both
opinions he has written on the subject exhibit an extremely narrow
view of constitutionally permissible public aid to sectarian schools.
In Wolman v. Walter'" the Court reviewed a school system that
used public funds to provide six different types of aid to private
religious schools. The majority held that two of the six forms of
assistance were impermissible because of the relative ease with
which they could be converted into purely sectarian use. 8 1 Justice
Stevens concurred in this finding, but would have struck down any
direct or indirect aid to sectarian schools' educational programs,
which he found to be "at heart . . . religious."" The rigor of his
establishment clause position required that he reject the three-
pronged establishment test' developed by the Court in recent
182. Id. at 561.
183. Id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 572-73 (Brennan, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 612.
186. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
187. Id. at 254. The approved forms of aid included secular textbooks, standardized
tests, speech and hearing diagnostic services, and guidance counseling to private school
pupils. Those forms of aid not allowed were the instructional materials and field trip transpor-
tation.
188. Id. at 265 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
would have upheld the financing of diagnostic and therapeutic services, though with "some
misgivings," because he felt those aspects of the program could be "administered in a consti-'
tutional manner." Id. at 265-66. Thus, his view of the establishment clause, though strict, is
not absolute.
189. The establishment test now used by the Court, set out first in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
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school subsidy cases." 0 Under Justice Stevens' analysis, "a state
subsidy of sectarian schools is invalid regardless of the form it
takes.""'
This literal reading of the establishment clause also appears in
Stevens' dissent in Roemer v. Board of Public Works"' in which
public aid in the form of noncategorical grants to eligible colleges
was challenged. The majority rejected the challenge on the grounds
that since the colleges were not pervasively sectarian and the money
was limited to nonsectarian use, the aid did not result in excessive
entanglement between church and state."' Justice Stevens dis-
sented, agreeing with Justice Brennan that such general subsidies
tend to promote the type of interdependence between religion and
the state that the first amendment was designed to prevent."' Fur-
ther, he stressed "the pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to
tempt religious schools to compromise their religious mission with-
out wholly abandoning it.""
Thus, Justice Stevens' insistence that the establishment clause
be strictly construed is consistent with his pro-individual rights
orientation because he believes that the entanglement of church and
state resulting from public aid to parochial schools might in the long
run harm the individual beneficiaries of the assistance. In Wolman,
Justice Stevens summarized his criticism of the majority's estab-
lishment clause position by observing: "What should be a 'high and
impregnable' wall between church and state, has been reduced to a
"blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier .
(4) Conclusion
Justice Stevens' first amendment opinions reveal a decidedly
pro-individual rights stance. This orientation is most evident in his
refusal to sanction criminal prosecutions and the attendant threat
to personal liberty as a means of controlling obscenity. Concur-
rently, the absence of a threat to individual liberty explains his
403 U.S. 602 (1971), requires that a law have a "secular legislative purpose," that its principal
or primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion, and that it not foster an "excessive
government entanglement" with religion. Id. at 612-13. See also Committee for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973).
190. 433 U.S. at 265 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
191. Id.
192. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
193. Id. at 762, 764. The holding is clearly based on the majority's assumption that
absolute hermetic separation of church and state is practically impossible. Id. at 745-46.
194. Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 770.
195. Id. at 775. He continued: "The disease of entanglement may infect a law discourag-
ing wholesome religious activity as well as a law encouraging the propagation of a given
faith." Id.
196. 433 U.S. at 266 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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willingness to allow noncriminal regulation of obscenity. Moreover,
he finds that noncriminal controls have an indirect and less severe
effect on the individual's right of expression. Justice Stevens' free
press opinions indicate his recognition that the function of the press
is the enlightenment of the public and that an unimpeded flow of
information often protects the public interest. His unwillingness to
restrict the right of the press to gather and disseminate information
is thus based, in part at least, on the adverse effect such a restriction
would have on the recipients and their right to be informed. Finally,
his establishment clause opinions reveal a characteristic reluctance
to allow even seemingly insignificant abrogations of the amend-
ment's provisions, again because of their essential role in the protec-
tion of individual rights from government infringement.
C. Equal Protection Analytical Method
The preceding two sections of the Special Project provide in-
sight into Justice Stevens' consistently strong pro-individual rights
philosophy. This section seeks to shift the emphasis away from Jus-
tice Stevens' substantive individual rights orientation, to an exami-
nation of his analytical methods in this broad area, particularly in
terms of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In applying these
amendments in the individual rights context, the Supreme Court
has developed three basic analytical frameworks: substantive due
process, procedural due process, and equal protection. Because one
of the most important issues presently facing the courts, reverse
discrimination, raises fundamental equal protection questions, the
primary focus of the following discussion will be upon Justice Ste-
vens' equal protection opinions.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,"' the prin-
cipal reverse discrimination case of the 1977 Term, Justice Stevens
wrote a dissenting opinion"' in which he found a constitutional
holding on the issue unnecessary because adequate statutory
grounds existed to decide the case."' Justice Stevens found that the
197. 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978).
198. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined the Stevens opin-
ion. Id. at 2809.
199. Id. at 2810-11. In making this determination, Justice Stevens relied upon Spector
Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). In Spector the characterization of a tax
imposed upon out-of-state business corporations by the State of Connecticut was at issue.
The district court had held that no constitutional issue existed because the tax was on the
franchise of carrying on intrastate commerce in Connecticut. Id. at 102. The court of appeals,
however, held that the tax was imposed on corporations engaged in interstate commerce
exclusively; consequently, the commerce clause was implicated. Id. at 102-03. The Supreme
Court held that this characterization was a matter of state law, which, until interpreted by a
state court, should not be subjected to scrutiny. Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter
said: "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitu-
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University, an entity receiving federal financial assistance, had vio-
lated section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196411o by
excluding respondent from its medical program because of his
race.2eI Justice Stevens stated that only the validity of the special
admissions program202 as it related to respondent's application was
at issue, not the validity of the program generally.2ss Stevens also
stated that whether race may be used as a factor in admissions was
not an issue before the Court; consequently, he found any discussion
of that issue inappropriate?'1
Contrary to the position taken by Justice Stevens, Justices
Powell""s and Brennan"' agreed that the standard of illegal discrimi-
nation under Title VI was coterminous with the constitutional stan-
dard set forth in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.ss? Although both Justices Powell and Brennan used
equal protection analysis in considering Bakke, they differed in
their application of this analysis. Justice Powell, using a "strict
scrutiny" standard, 20 8 found that the medical school's special ad-
tional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . .
unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Id. at 105.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Section 601 provides: "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
201. 98 S.Ct. at 2815. Respondent was a white male.
202. The Medical School of the University of California at Davis maintained two admis-
sions programs. Under the regular admissions program, applicants competed for 84 places.
Under the special admissions program, minority applicants were competing for 100 places,
while nonminority applicants were competing for only 84. See id. at 2739-42.
203. Id. at 2809-10 & n.3.
204. Id. at 2810.
205. Justice Powell's opinion expressed the judgment of the Court.
206. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, White, and Blackmun, concurred
in part and dissented in part.
207. 98 S.Ct. at 2747, 2768.
208. In deciding that a strict scrutiny standard was proper, Justice Powell had to
resolve a fundamental equal protection issue raised by the contrary positions of the University
and respondent. The University contended that the strict scrutiny standard was only justified
when a classification disadvantaged a discrete and insular minority, traditionally discrimi-
nated against by the majoritarian political process. Id. at 2747. Respondent, however, argued
that the level of judicial scrutiny did not depend upon membership in such a group. Id. In
short, the University argued that the composition of the class of litigant challenging the
constitutionality of a classification determines the standard of review, while respondent
argued that the nature of the classification itself determines the standard of review. Citing
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), for the proposition that fourteenth amendment rights
are personal rights, Justice Powell agreed with respondent. 98 S.Ct. at 2748. To Justice
Powell, any racial or ethnic classification is "inherently suspect" and consequently requires
the "most exacting judicial examination." Id. at 2749. Justice Powell stated that when a
classification touches "upon an individual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a
judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest." Id. at 2753.
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missions program would violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment; consequently, he affirmed the California
Supreme Court's judgment that the program violated the four-
teenth amendment.20 Justice Brennan, on the other hand, using a
less exacting standard of review, found that the special admissions
program did not violate Title VI because it would not violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 10
Justice Stevens' resolution of Bakke left unclear how he would
address and resolve a reverse racial discrimination problem on con-
stitutional grounds. Justice Stevens' Supreme Court opinions do not
indicate clearly that he also would have invalidated the preferential
admissions program under equal protection. In Bakke itself, Justice
Stevens suggested that the standard by which to judge a program's
validity under section 601 differs from the standard applicable
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
stating: "The statutory prohibition against discrimination in feder-
ally funded projects contained in § 601 is more than a simple para-
209. In applying strict scrutiny, Justice Powell found that the consideration of race in
the special admissions program was justified by the state's compelling interest in maintaining
academic freedom and diversity in the student body. He concluded, however, that the quota
adopted for minority admissions was not the least restrictive means of achieving the
legitimate goal. Id. at 2761-64. The Court thus did not hold that any consideration of the race
of an applicant was impermissible; only the particular system used by Davis was invalid.
Whether Justice Powell held that the special admissions program violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment is unclear. See id. at 2764.
210. Justice Brennan apparently accepted the University's position that strict scrutiny
was inappropriate because respondent did not belong to a class that possessed the traditional
characteristics of suspectness. Id. at 2782-83. Justice Brennan, however, stated that simply
because "this case does not fit neatly into our prior analytic framework for race cases does
not mean that it should be analyzed by applying the very loose rational-basis standard of
review . . . ." Id. at 2783. Analogizing to the reverse sex discrimination cases, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, 427 U.S. 190 (1977), Justice Brennan noted that a racial classification with a benign
purpose must further important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to those objectives. 98 S.Ct. at 2784. As the following quotation indicates, the Brennan
standard is difficult to pinpoint:
In sum, because of the significant risk that racial classifications established for
ostensibly benign purposes can be misused, causing effects not unlike those created by
invidious classifications, it is inappropriate to inquire only whether there is any conceiv-
able bases that might sustain such a classification. Instead, to justify such a classifica-
tion an important and articulated purpose for its use must be shown. In addition, any
statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any group or that singles out those least well
represented in the political process to bear the brunt of a benign program. Thus our
review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict-not " 'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact," because it is stigma that causes fatality-but strict and searching nonethe-
less.
Id. at 2785 (footnotes omitted).
211. Id. at 2813. Justice Stevens added: "We are dealing with a distinct statutory
prohibition, enacted at a particular time with particular concerns in mind; neither its Ian-
guage nor any prior interpretation suggests that its place in the Civil Rights Act, won after
long debate, is simply that of a constitutional appendage." Id. at 2814 (footnote omitted).
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phrasing of what the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment would re-
quire." 21 1 Furthermore, in General Electric v. Gilbert,212 Justice Ste-
vens, criticizing the Court for extending equal protection standards
into the Title VII area, argued that "the plaintiffs' burden of prov-
ing a prima facie violation of [the equal protection clause] is signif-
icantly heavier than the burden of proving a prima facie violation
of a statutory prohibition against discrimination . . . ."213 Conse-
quently, a conclusion that Justice Stevens would find that a prefer-
ential admissions program violates equal protection does not follow
necessarily from his determination that the program violated sec-
tion 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The following discussion
attempts to ascertain first, whether Justice Stevens would adopt
either of the approaches suggested by Justices Powell and Brennan
in Bakke, or a different analysis, if compelled to consider the reverse
racial discrimination question in constitutional terms, and second,
why he avoided using equal protection analysis in Bakke.
Mathews v. Diaz,2" one of Justice Stevens' first cases as a Su-
preme Court Justice, considered a fifth amendment equal protec-
tion challenge of a federal statute that permitted aliens to partici-
pate in a federal medical insurance program only if they had resided
in the United States for a five-year period and had become perma-
nent residents.1 After recognizing that the political branches of the
federal government traditionally have been responsible for control-
ling immigration and naturalization, 2 16 Justice Stevens stated that
"[t]he reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions
also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the
Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturaliza-
tion.""2 1 According to Justice Stevens, to satisfy this "narrow" stan-
dard, those challenging a line that Congress has drawn must ad-
vance "principled reasoning" that simultaneously invalidates Con-
gress' line and justifies another.2 18 Justice Stevens viewed the chal-
lengers' failure to advance this principled reasoning as an invitation
for the Court to substitute its judgment for that of Congress. 219 Re-
fusing to question Congress' judgment in this manner, Justice Ste-
vens upheld the constitutionality of the classification.220
212. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
213. Id. at 160.
214. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975).
216. 426 U.S. at 81.
217. Id. at 81-82 (footnote omitted).
218. Id. at 82.
219. Id. at 84.
220. See id.
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In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong22' Stevens applied an analysis
that differed from the one employed in Diaz.2 2 In Mow Sun Wong
aliens challenged under the fifth amendment the constitutionality
of a Civil Service Commission regulation that barred noncitizens
from federal employment. 22 Justice Stevens noted that the regula-
tion detrimentally affected a discrete group of persons who already
suffered disadvantages greater than the remainder of the com-
munity.2u In describing the impact of the regulation, Justice Ste-
vens stated:
The added disadvantage resulting from the enforcement of the rule-ineligi-
bility for employment in a major sector of the economy-is of sufficient signifi-
cance to be characterized as a deprivation of an interest in liberty. Indeed, we
deal with a rule which deprives a discrete class of persons of an interest in
liberty on a wholesale basis. By reason of the Fifth Amendment, such a depri-
vation must be accompanied by due process. It follows that some judicial
scrutiny of the deprivation is mandated by the Constitution.m
The challengers had argued that traditional equal protection
analysis justified a holding that invalidated the regulation. 2 6 JUS-
tice Stevens, however, after recognizing the equal protection compo-
nent of the fifth amendment, stated that it was "not necessary to
resolve respondents' substantive claim, if a narrower inquiry dis-
closes that essential procedures have not been followed." 227 Accord-
ing to Justice Stevens, the federal government is competent to as-
sert successfully that certain national interests justify a discrimina-
tory rule, which, if asserted by a state, would be insufficient to
satisfy the requirements of fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion.m When the government offered national interests to support
the regulation challenged in Mow Sun Wongm22 Justice Stevens
221. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
222. Justice Stevens authored the opinion of the Court.
223. 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976).
224. 426 U.S. at 102.
225. Id. at 102-03 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
226. Id. at 103.
227. Id.
228. Justice Stevens explained:
The federal sovereign, like the States, must govern impartially. The concept of
equal justice under law is served by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process,
as well as by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although both
Amendments require the same type of analysis, the Court of Appeals correctly stated
that the two protections are not always coextensive. Not only does the language of the
two Amendments differ, but more importantly, there may be overriding national inter-
ests which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individ-
ual State.
Id. at 100 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
In Foley v. Connelie, 98 S.Ct. 1067 (1978), Justice Stevens dissented from the majority's
holding that a New York statute that excluded aliens from employment as state troopers
did not violate the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1076.
229. The government claimed that the regulation furthered the national interest in
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rather than addressing the sufficiency of the government's argu-
ments, shifted the focus of his analysis from equal protection to a
"narrower inquiry" by stating that "due process requires that there
be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually in-
tended to serve that interest."o Assuming that the reasons asserted
by the government would justify the rule barring federal employ-
ment of aliens if it had been created by Congress or the President231
Justice Stevens nonetheless found that the Civil Service Commis-
sion was competent to assert only the justification of administrative
convenience. 23 2 This justification was inadequate, he concluded,
because nothing indicated that administrative convenience was the
actual purpose of the regulation.m Furthermore, administrative
convenience could not justify such a wholesale deprivation of a lib-
erty interest; 4 Consequently, Justice Stevens agreed with the chal-
lengers that the regulation was invalid, but not on the traditional
equal protection grounds they asserted.25
In Mathews v. Lucas,ms the Court faced a classification that
treated illegitimate children less favorably than legitimate chil-
dren.23 Although the majority recognized that the statute was illogi-
cal and unjust, it held that the classification did not violate the fifth
amendment.m In dissent,mss Justice Stevens criticized the majority
three ways. First, the rule enhanced the President's power in negotiating treaties because he
could offer jobs to aliens in exchange for similar concessions from foreign governments. Sec-
ond, the rule provided an incentive for aliens to become citizens. Third, certain sensitive
employment positions required citizenship, and the broad exclusion avoided job classification
problems. The government also noted that the exclusionary rule was consistent with interna-
tional law and the customs of other countries and that it had been the practice in the United
States for over 100 years. 426 U.S. at 104.
230. Id. at 103.
231. Id. at 116.
232. Justice Stevens noted that the Civil Service Commission's responsibility is pro-
moting efficiency in the federal civil service, not the conduct of foreign affairs. Id. at 114.
233. Justice Stevens stated: "There is nothing in the record before us . . . to indicate
that the Commission actually made any considered evaluation of the relative desirability of
a simple exclusionary rule on the one hand, or the value to the service of enlarging the pool
of eligible employees on the other." Id. at 115.
234. Id. at 115-16.
235. Id. at 116-17.
236. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
237. The case considered the constitutionality of § 402(d)(3) of the Social Security Act.
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970 & Supp. IV 1975). Under the Act, a person who is under 18 years
of age and who is dependent upon a person fully insured under the Act is entitled to receive
survivor's benefits upon the death of the insured person. Section 402(d)(3), which defines
dependency, presumes that a legitimate child is dependent. An illegitimate child, however,
is considered dependent only if: (1) the decedent had married the other parent; (2) the
decedent had acknowledged in writing that the child was his; (3) a court had decreed that
the child was the decedent's; or (4) a court had ordered the decedent to support the child.
See 427 U.S. at 499.
238. See 427 U.S. at 516.
239. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in the Stevens dissent.
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by asserting his belief that "an admittedly illogical and unjust re-
sult should not be accepted without both a better explanation and
also something more than a 'possibly rational' basis."240 Because
illegitimates have been a traditionally disfavored class in our so-
ciety, Justice Stevens contended that "the Court should be espe-
cially vigilant in examining any classification which involves illegi-
timacy."24 ' Justice Stevens argued for enhanced scrutiny of tradi-
tional classifications because of his fear that legislators draw lines
on the basis of habit, not analysis. This "stereotyped reaction,"
according to Justice Stevens, may have no rational relationship to
the purpose for which a classification was established. 24 2 To Justice
Stevens the statute was invalid because, contrary to the govern-
ment's position, administrative convenience was not the rationale
for the classification; rather, the classification was the result of a
tradition of considering illegitimates as undeserving persons. 24 3
Justice Stevens' opinions in Diaz, Mow Sun Wong, and Lucas
indicate dissatisfication with the standards of review used in the
traditional two-tiered equal protection analysis. In Diaz, an equal
protection case, Justice Stevens did not rely upon equal protection
cases to establish the proper standard of review, focusing instead
upon a case considering the justiciability of a political question. 244
Also, in Diaz Stevens did not use traditional equal protection termi-
nology to describe the deferential standard he applied. Although
apparently utilizing a "rational basis" standard, he did not refer to
it in such language. The indications in the Diaz opinion that Justice
Stevens is uncomfortable with equal protection analysis are ampli-
fied by the approach he adopted in Mow Sun Wong, in which he
avoided what was clearly an equal protection claim by deciding the
case on due process grounds. In Lucas Justice Stevens further mani-
fested this discomfort by again failing to use traditional equal pro-
tection terminology. Referring to the majority's "rational basis" test
240. 427 U.S. at 519-20. The classification was illogical because legitimacy has no
relation to one's ability to contribute to society. It was unjust because legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility. Id. at 518-19.
241. Id. at 520.
242. Justice Stevens explained:
For a traditional classification is more likely to be used without pausing to consider its
justification than is a newly created classification. Habit, rather than analysis, makes
it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female, alien and
citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our history there was the same
inertia in distinguishing between black and white. But that sort of stereotyped reaction
may have no rational relationship-other than pure prejudicial discrimination-to the
stated purpose for which the classification is being made.
Id. at 520-21 (footnote omitted).
243. Id. at 523.
244. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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as a "possibly rational" standard, he characterized his own stan-
dard as "especially vigilant." Significantly, Justice Stevens chose
not to use classic articulations such as "suspect classification" or
"compelling state interest."
Justice Stevens' growing dissatisfaction with traditional equal
protection became explicit in his concurrence in Craig v. Boren,m'5
in which he stated:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to
govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review
in some cases and a different standard in other cases. Whatever criticism may
be leveled at a judicial opinion implying that there are at least three such
standards applies with the same force to a double standard.
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to
explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consis-
tent fashion. I also suspect that a careful explanation of the reasons motivating
particular decisions may contribute more to an identification of that standard
than an attempt to articulate it in all-encompassing terms.m
According to Justice Stevens, the traditional equal protection anal-
ysis is not a rational way to decide cases. He claims that only one
equal protection standard exists, despite the Court's continuing es-
pousal of the two-tiered analysis. Justice Stevens contends that
general attempts to describe the single standard are not as valuable
as specific explanations for individual holdings.
Since Boren, Justice Stevens' equal protection opinions24 7 have
included no language attempting to describe the proper standard of
review. Unlike his opinions in Diaz, Mow Sun Wong, and Lucas, he
no longer uses phrases such as "narrow standard of review," "some
scrutiny," or "especially vigilant" to describe his level of scrutiny.
Instead, Justice Stevens simply states whether the classification is
valid and then explains why in a detailed manner. Because Justice
Stevens now believes that attempting to articulate the appropriate
equal protection standard of review is futile, the nature and rigor of
his equal protection analysis can be gleaned only by examining his
most recent equal protection opinions. Craig v. Boren and Califano
v. Goldfarb are particularly indicative of his present approach;
moreover, they are reverse sex discrimination cases.
In Boren Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's invali-
dation of an Oklahoma statute forbidding the sale of beer to males
245. 429 U.S. 190 (1977).
246. Id. at 211-12.
247. See Idaho Dep't of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977); Califano v. Jobst,
434 U.S. 47 (1977); Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977); Alexander v. Fioto, 430 U.S. 634
(1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks,
430 U.S. 73 (1977); Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288 (1976).
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between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one."' Justice Stevens
found the statute unconstitutional for several reasons. First, he ob-
jected to the classification as being based upon an accident of
birth.249 Second, the classification was "a mere remnant of the now
almost universally rejected tradition of discrimination against
males in this age bracket.""' Third, Justice Stevens observed that
to the extent the classification attempted to distinguish physically
between males and females, it was "perverse."25'
Despite these objections to the classification, Justice Stevens
was willing to consider the state's argument that the promotion of
traffic safety justified the statute. Although acknowledging that the
classification was not completely irrational,'2 Justice Stevens found
the traffic safety justification unacceptable. Citing the statute's de
minimis effect on traffic safety, Justice Stevens found it difficult to
believe that this was the actual purpose of the classification.23
Moreover, Justice Stevens noted the absence of legislative history
indicating that traffic safety was the actual justification.25 Al-
though admitting that he was not sure what motivated the classifi-
cation, Justice Stevens stated that he "would not be surprised if it
represented nothing more than the perpetuation of a stereotyped
attitude about the relative maturity of the members of the two sexes
in this age bracket.""' Finally, he objected to the inherent unfair-
ness of the statute.2'5
In Califano v. Goldfarbsl Justice Stevens concurred with the
majority's invalidation of a provision of the Social Security Act that
treated widows more favorably than widowers.25 Justice Stevens
248. The Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to females under age 18 and
to males under age 21. OmLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (1958 & Supp. 1976).
249. 429 U.S. at 212.
250. Id. (footnote omitted).
251. Id. at 212-13. In a footnote Justice Stevens explained that the heavier weight of
males gave them greater capacity to consume alcohol without diminishing their driving
ability. Id. at 213 n.4.
252. Evidence demonstrated that in this age bracket more males drove than females
and also more males drank. Id. at 213.
253. Id. Justice Stevens observed that the statute prohibited only the sale of 3.2% beer
to males under age 21, not the consumption of 3.2% beer by males under age 21. He also noted
that 3.2% beer is not a very intoxicating beverage. Id.
254. Id. at 213 n.5.
255. Id.
256. The record demonstrated that only two percent of the males in this age bracket
violated laws related to alcohol consumption. According to Justice Stevens, despite an argua-
ble, slight deterrent effect on the two percent, or on the 98 percent, "an insult to all the young
men of the State [could not] be justified by visiting the sins of the 2% on the 98%." Id. at
214.
257. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
258. Under § 402(f)(1)(D) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(D) (1970 &
Supp. V 1975), to receive survivors' benefits, a widower had to demonstrate that, prior to his
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began by noting that the classification was not invidious because it
did not imply that males were inferior.259 Furthermore, the classifi-
cation neither hindered a large class because of the conduct of a
few, 2 0 nor burdened an already disadvantaged discrete minority.21
Justice Stevens, however, was sensitive to the statute's different
treatment of similarly situated persons solely because they were not
of the same sex. 2 2
The federal government attempted to justify the discrimination
against widowers by asserting that it was necessary for administra-
tive convenience. After comparing the administrative savings to the
cost of payments to widows who would not receive payments if they
had to prove dependency,6 3 Justice Stevens concluded that admin-
istrative savings could not have been the actual rationale. 2 4 The
government also attempted to justify the discrimination by arguing
that its purpose was to redress the effects of the tradition of discrim-
ination against females. Justice Stevens observed, however, that the
nondependent widows who benefited from the discrimination were
the females least likely to need assistance in overcoming the effects
of prior discrimination.6 5 Therefore, Justice Stevens cited
"[r]espect for the legislative process" 26 in concluding that the sta-
tutory classification did not have this benign purpose. At this point,
he theorized on the origin of the classification:
It is fair to infer that habit, rather than analysis . . , made it seem accepta-
ble to equate the terms "widow" and "dependent surviving spouse." That kind
of automatic reflex is far different from either a legislative decision to favor
females in order to compensate for past wrongs, or a legislative decision that
spouse's death, at least one-half of his support came from his spouse. Widows received
benefits without such demonstration.
259. 430 U.S. at 218. In this regard, Justice Stevens contrasted the present case from
Mathews v. Lucas. See notes 236-42 supra and accompanying text.
260. 430 U.S. at 218. Justice Stevens contrasted this situation to Craig v. Boren, in
which the acts of a small percentage of the male population resulted in a deprivation to the
vast majority. See notes 245-56 supra and accompanying text.
261. 430 U.S. at 218. Justice Stevens contrasted the widowers in Goldfarb to the aliens
in Mow Sun Wong. See notes 221-35 supra and accompanying text.
262. 430 U.S. at 219.
263. Only about 10 percent of the women in the relevant age bracket were nondepen-
dent; consequently, the rule expedited 90 percent of the applications. Justice Stevens admit-
ted that this resulted in significant administrative savings. He estimated, however, that the
payments to the nondependent women amounted to approximately 750 million dollars per
year. He concluded: "It is inconceivable that Congress would have authorized such large
expenditures for an administrative purpose without the benefit of any cost analysis, or indeed,
without even discussing the problem." Id. at 220.
264. Id.
265. According to Justice Stevens, these women had been successful enough in the job




the administrative savings exceed the cost of extending benefits to nondepen-
dent widows."'
Justice Stevens concluded by stating that the disparate treatment
of widows and widowers could not be justified by accident."' In a
footnote, Justice Stevens suggested that the statute might have
been upheld if it had been supported by an "actual, considered
legislative choice," but he reserved the question until such a choice
was made. 269
Although Justice Stevens now refuses to articulate a standard
of review, Boren and Goldfarb make evident certain characteristics
of Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis. His scrutiny concen-
trates on ascertaining the actual legislative purpose for creating a
classification. Justice Stevens thus is unwilling to accept justifica-
tions that are conjured up only to defend a statute in litigation.
Related to his inquiry into actual legislative motivation is Justice
Stevens' concern with classifications that are invidious, those based
upon immutable characteristics, and those burdening an already
disadvantaged discrete minority. Traditionally, the Court has con-
sidered these factors in determining the appropriate standard of
review to apply in equal protection analysis. According to Justice
Stevens' interpretation of traditional equal protection analysis,
however, there is only one standard of review; consequently, in his
analysis, these factors do not serve their traditional function. They
are important to Justice Stevens, however, because they aid in mak-
ing the crucial determination whether a classification is the result
of an actual legislative judgment. For Justice Stevens, "traditional
classifications," such as those based upon sex, race, or legitimacy,
are often "accidents," "stereotyped reactions," or "automatic re-
flexes"-as distinguished from deliberate legislative considera-
tion-that often have no rational basis. Thus the principal concern
in Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis is finding an actual
legislative purpose. If he finds none, the classification is invalid; if
an actual legislative purpose is evident, he generally defers to it. 21
By deciding an equal protection case in this manner, arguably Jus-
tice Stevens does not substitute his judgment for that of the legisla-
267. Id. at 222. Justice Stevens continued:
I am therefore persuaded that this discrimination against a group of males is merely the
accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females . . . . In my judg-
ment, something more than an accident is necessary to justify the disparate treatment




269. Id. at 223 n.9.
270. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977); Alexander v. Fioto, 430 U.S. 634 (1977);
Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288 (1976).
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ture because if no actual purpose exists, legislative judgment was
never exercised.
In Boren and Goldfarb, deciding that no actual legislative judg-
ment existed enabled Justice Stevens to avoid the fundamental
issue in reverse discrimination, the extent to which the state's inter-
est in reducing the effects of past discrimination outweighs the indi-
vidual's interest in being free from present discrimination. He char-
acterized the statutes as "accidents" or "stereotyped reactions." In
Bakke the special admissions program clearly was the result of an
actual judgment by the medical school faculty. Consequently, had
Justice Stevens applied his equal protection analysis in Bakke, he
would have been unable to characterize the special admissions pro-
gram as an "accident." By emphasizing the legislative nature of the
required actual judgment, however, Justice Stevens could have
challenged the medical school faculty's competence to establish a
special admissions program2" and thus could have held that the
program violated the equal protection clause. This reasoning would
have produced a result identical to his statutory holding in Bakke.272
Nevertheless, deciding the case in this manner again avoids resolv-
ing the fundamental issue in reverse discrimination. Avoiding this
balancing is the only way that Justice Stevens could decide Bakke
consistently with his statutory holding because Justice Stevens'
equal protection opinions suggest that he has been unable to de-
velop an analysis capable of resolving this fundamental issue.
As noted earlier, in Bakke Justice Stevens claimed that a con-
stitutional resolution was unnecessary because adequate statutory
grounds existed to decide the controversy. 27 3 Review of Justice Ste-
vens' equal protection opinions, however, reveals another, perhaps
the principal, reason for his statutory holding: he is dissatisfied and
uncomfortable with traditional equal protection analysis, and has
not developed a satisfactory analysis of his own.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE COURT
A. Introduction
Since his ascendance to the Supreme Court three Terms ago
Justice Stevens has written several opinions reflecting a keen aware-
271. Justice Powell did this in Bakke. He stated: "[I]solated segments of our vast
governmental structures are not competent to make [decisions regarding which minority
groups deserve favorable treatment], at least in the absence of legislative mandates and
legislatively determined criteria." 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2758-59. Justice Stevens has questioned the
competence of federal agencies to assert certain justifications for regulations. See note 232
supra and accompanying text.
272. See text accompanying notes 200-01 supra.
273. See notes 198-99 supra and accompanying text. See also Part IV(D) infra.
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ness of the unique roles that the judiciary in general and the Su-
preme Court in particular play in the constitutional and political
framework of the United States. Although the Court rarely con-
fronts these issues directly in the resolution of a primary legal con-
flict, Justice Stevens has demonstrated a proclivity toward amplify-
ing the less obvious, secondary issues that frequently can be reduced
to a single, fundamental problem-what is the proper role of the
Court?
Questions concerning the Court's proper role arise in various
contexts; besides calling for the resolution of a specific legal debate,
virtually every justiciable controversy invites the Court to assess the
impact of its immediate decision on other actors in the political
process-coordinate federal branches, the states and their political
subdivisions, and future litigants. Moreover, a particular Justice's
treatment of these seemingly ancillary issues frequently is the only
formal indication of his constitutional perspective. Consequently,
this section analyzes a number of Justice Stevens' opinions in which
he elaborates on the Court's constitutional and political role. The
number of opinions is relatively small, and Justice Stevens' relevant
discussion in them is frequently terse, but some consistent trends
are discernible.
Many of the issues discussed in this section traverse those cov-
ered elsewhere in this Special Project. The primary objective here,
however, is to ascertain Justice Stevens' perception of the constitu-
tional and political significance of the Bench on which he sits, rather
than the substantive content of his constitutional doctrine. In order
to achieve that objective, three principal topics will be examined.
First, the discussion centers on Justice Stevens' willingness to exer-
cise the Court's discretionary review power. His high standards for
granting certiorari, his narrow view of mootness, and his ardent
criticism of his colleagues for rendering written dissents to denials
of certiorari are included under this heading. Second, the inquiry
focuses on Justice Stevens' willingness to defer to the judgment of
coordinate federal branches, state legislatures and courts, and lower
federal courts. The specific topics include his liberal deference to
congressional policymaking, his more restricted but still liberal de-
ference to administrative agencies, his narrow view of the abstention
doctrine, and his clear respect for the judgment of federal trial and
appellate courts. Third, this section analyzes a number of miscella-
neous issues that reflect upon Justice Stevens' preference for an
adjudicatory rather than a policymaking judicial branch. These is-
sues include his view of the jurisdictional power of the Court, his
relatively narrow view of standing and the stay power of the Court,
his preference for statutory rather than constitutional resolution
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whenever possible, his view of the role of precedent, his perception
of the Court's constitutional power as compared to that of the execu-
tive and legislative branches, and his overriding concern for judicial
economy.
B. The Exercise of the Court's Discretionary
Review Power
(1) When Should the Court Grant Certiorari?
Whether to grant certiorari is the most frequent decision made
by a Supreme Court Justice."' The reasons for granting or denying
certiorari in a given case provide a valuable insight into the consti-
tutional process: the Court's willingness to hear a case frequently is
as important as its ultimate resolution of the issues in the case.
Historically the Court has been extremely selective in exercising its
discretionary review power, granting certiorari in only one of ten
cases. 5 Although the most evident reason for selective review is
that consideration of all cases would be unmanageable if not impos-
sible, other factors undoubtedly affect the decision-the signifi-
cance of the issues presented, potential political repercussion, or the
likelihood that the court below committed error, among others.
Analyzing the standards by which a Justice determines whether to
grant certiorari is important, since the type of case he chooses to
hear and his reasons for doing so indicate the role in which he views
himself and the Court.
In Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith27 8 Justice Ste-
vens dissented from the Court's reversal of the Idaho Supreme
Court?' arguing that the Court should not have granted certiorari.
Pointing out that the state court had held the state statute violated
the federal Constitution, he properly categorized the case as one for
discretionary, not mandatory, review.Y' Moreover, in his view the
274. The Court currently reviews over 3000 petitions for writs of certiorari annually. See
Singleton v. Commissioner, 99 S.Ct. 335, 338 n.2 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
275. This past term the Court exercised its discretionary review power on 323 occasions,
denying certiorari in well over 3000 cases. Id.
276. 434 U.S. 100 (1977).
277. Plaintiff challenged an Idaho statute that allowed persons attending night school
but not those attending daytime school to collect unemployment compensation, contending
that the classification denied daytime students equal protection of the laws under the four-
teenth amendment. Although plaintiff prevailed before the Idaho Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the state statute, citing the traditional deference given to state
legislatures in the area of social welfare and economics. The majority also pointed out that
the classes in the instant case were rational because daytime employment is more plentiful
than nighttime work so that daytime school imposes a greater restriction on finding employ-
ment. Id. at 101.
278. Referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976), Justice Stevens stated:
In defining the jurisdiction of this Court to review the final judgments rendered by
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case did not warrant the exercise of discretionary review: "Since this
decision does not create a conflict and does not involve a question
of national importance, it is inappropriate to grant certiorari and
order full briefing and oral argument."27 Even though Justice Ste-
vens acknowledged that the state court erroneously used the four-
teenth amendment to provide plaintiff with more protection than
the federal Constitution required, he still contended that certiorari
should not have been granted:
I do not believe that error is a sufficient justification for the exercise of
this Court's discretionary jurisdiction. We are much too busy to correct every
error that is called to our attention in the thousands of certiorari petitions that
are filed each year. Whenever we attempt to do so summarily, we court the
danger of either committing error ourselves or of confusing rather than clarify-
ing the law . . . . Moreover, this Court's random and spasmodic efforts to
correct errors summarily may create the unfortunate impression that the Court
is more interested in upholding the power of the State than in vindicating
individual rightsY0
Justice Stevens has voiced the same objection on subsequent
occasions. Calling the majority's disposition of the case "cavalier,"
he elaborated on his standard for granting certiorari in Oregon State
Penitentiary v. Hammer:?'
In my judgment, even assuming that the Oregon Supreme Court has
extended greater procedural protection to Oregon residents than the Federal
Constitution requires, there is no need for this Court to address those issues
until a conflict with the Oregon holding has developed on a national level. But
if my judgment in this respect is incorrect, and enlightenment on a nationwide
basis is indeed appropriate, surely the Court should provide something more
edifying than a cryptic reference to a case as wide of the mark as Dixon v. Love.
This summary treatment of a carefully reasoned decision of the highest court
of the State of Oregon fails to accord proper respect to that tribunal and gives
no guidance whatsoever for further proceedings in this litigation. 2
The dissent in Hammer seems less directed at judicial economy or
the highest court of a State, Congress has sharply differentiated between cases in which
the state court has rejected a federal claim and those in which the federal claim has been
vindicated. In the former category our jurisdiction is mandatory; in the latter, it is
discretionary.
Id. at 103 (footnote omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 104.
280. Id. at 104-05.
281. 434 U.S. 945 (1977). The Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment below,
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). In
Hammer the Oregon Supreme Court had held that a post-termination hearing for discharged,
tenured state employees violated the procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment. Justice Stevens criticized the Court's summary disposition following the grant
of certiorari, saying "[slince Dixon v. Love sheds no light on the issues decided by the Oregon
Supreme Court, the Court's disposition of this petition can only be characterized as cavalier."
434 U.S. at 945 (citation omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 946-47. For further discussion of the concern over misuse of summary disposi-
tion, see Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the deemphasis of probable error, since the Hammer state court did
not so clearly fail to follow federal constitutional law as did the court
in Smith. Instead, Justice Stevens' main concern in Hammer, as in
Smith, was that the issue presented was neither of national import-
ance nor in conflict among the state or federal courts. In addition,
both cases reflect that Justice Stevens disfavors granting certiorari
when the Court plans to do no more than summarily resolve or
remand the case without appropriate analysis or direction to the
lower court. The apparent rationale is that no treatment of the case
is better than potentially misleading or erroneous treatment, partic-
ularly if the decision whether to exercise discretionary review is
close at the outset.
Justice Stevens has not always been consistent, however, in
articulating his standards for granting certiorari. In Minnesota v.
Alexanderm' the majority of the Court dismissed the appeal284 for
want of jurisdiction and treated the petition as one for writ of cer-
tiorari, which was denied. In dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that
appeal may have been the proper avenue to the Court, but, without
deciding that appeal was proper, he went on to argue that "[t]he
case deserves plenary review because of its practical importance and
because of the likelihood that error has been committed." 285
Since the Court treated the petition as one for writ of certiorari,
and since Justice Stevens did not conclude that appeal was proper,
this statement reveals two inconsistencies. First, he used likelihood
of error as a basis for exercising the Court's discretionary review
power, while in Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith he ex-
pressly stated that error is an insufficient basis for granting certior-
ari. Second, he viewed Alexander as a case of practical import-
ance, not one of national importance, and did not contend that there
was a conflict among the lower courts on the issues presented in
Alexander .2 1 Even if Justice Stevens intended to make no distinc-
tion between a case of practical importance and one of national
importance for purposes of granting or denying certiorari, no ob-
vious standard exists for determining that an exemption from state
water pollution regulations2 m8 merits the Court's attention while
improper delineation of the bounds of equal protection and proce-
283. 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
284. The appeal was from the Eighth Circuit, which had held that dredging by the
Army Corps of Engineers was exempt from state water pollution regulations. Appeal was
sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1976), which applies if a federal court of appeals holds a
state statute invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.
285. 430 U.S. at 977-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286. See notes 277-80 supra and accompanying text.
287. See text accompanying note 279 supra.
288. See note 284 supra.
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dural due process do not.2 '
Such inconsistencies suggest that the articulated standards,
other than judicial economy, are not the sole or even principal bases
on which Justice Stevens decides whether to exercise discretionary
review. An analysis of the substantive issues in Smith, Hammer,
and Alexander suggests that Justice Stevens may be looking beyond
such matters as national importance or probable error to the sub-
stantive result he desires in the case. For example, in all three cases
the lower court ruled against the interest of the state. In Alexander
the lower court was a federal court, and the party in favor of whom
that court ruled was the federal government. In Smith and
Hammer, on the other hand, the lower court was a state court whose
decision was in favor of individual rights. In the latter two cases,
Justice Stevens would have allowed the pro-individual rights result
to stand by denying certiorari, whereas in Alexander he would have
granted certiorari in order to uphold the state's power to regulate
the activities of a federal agency.2"o Perhaps Justice Stevens' treat-
ment of discretionary review reflects his intuitive reaction to the
subject matter of a particular case, thus manifesting less directly his
general views toward individual rights29 1 and federal-state rela-
tions.'
One of the first cases in which Justice Stevens participated as
a member of the Court, Liles v. Oregon,13 confirms that judicial
economy is a major concern of the Justice in exercising discretionary
review. 294 In Liles Justice Stevens concurred in the denial of certior-
ari even though he disagreed with the substantive result," conced-
ing that to grant certiorari in case after case only to have precedent
with which he disagreed reaffirmed would be "pointless."'" This
statement initially seems to contradict the earlier analysis that sug-
gested Justice Stevens may exercise discretionary review according
289. See notes 277 & 281 supra.
290. Justice Stevens went on to assess the merits of the case in Alexander, arguing that
immunity from state pollution laws for the Army Corps of Engineers was waived by Congress
in § 313 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1976). See text
accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
291. See Part III supra.
292. See Part II supra.
293. 425 U.S. 963 (1976).
294. See also Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
School Dist. of Omaha v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295. Liles was an obscenity case arising after the Court decided Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973). Although Justice Stevens disagrees strongly with the local mores standard
established by the Court in Miller, he voted to deny certiorari in Liles because Miller was
controlling and a majority of the Court still support Miller. 425 U.S. at 964 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). See Part III(B)(1) supra.
296. 425 U.S. at 964.
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to his views on the substantive issue.' On closer examination, how-
ever, his approach in Liles is consistent with that analysis. Given
his recognition that he is in a clear minority among the Court on a
particular issue, voting to deny certiorari is the most expedient long-
term approach for altering the substantive law. Voting to grant
certiorari, which requires the votes of only four Justices, simply
would make more difficult the future goal of overruling the disagree-
able precedent, since each certiorari grant would increase the weight
of precedent. Denials of certiorari, on the other hand, have no prece-
dential value.' Thus, when a new majority develops, only the single
authority would need to be overruled.
Finally, Justice Stevens has expressed a relatively limited view
of mootness. In Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board299 he dissented from
the Court's per curiam remand and refusal to decide whether consti-
tutional safeguards of procedural due process apply to parole release
hearings. 0" Arguing that the question was an important one, Justice
Stevens cited the vast number of parole release decisions made
annually, the importance of those decisions to the potential parolee,
and the extensive litigation and split in the federal courts over the
question.3 o' Justice Stevens would therefore have granted certiorari
and resolved the case on its merits:
Although I have no doubt that the mootness issue will be correctly decided
after the proceedings on remand have run their course, the remand is neverthe-
less unfortunate. As dispositions in each of the last three years demonstrate,
the underlying issue is one that is capable of repetition, yet review is repeat-
edly evaded. Delay in deciding the merits will affect not only these litigants,
but also other pending litigation and parole procedures in every jurisdiction
in the country. A suggestion of mootness which this Court can readily decide
should not be permitted to have such farreaching consequences.302
In addition to the express concern for the waste of judicial resources
and the delay to the litigants caused by the majority's treatment of
the mootness issue, Justice Stevens' pro-individual rights orienta-
297. See text accompanying note 290 supra.
298. See Part IV(B)(2) infra.
299. 429 U.S. 60 (1976).
300. Justice Stevens contended that subsequent granting of parole did not moot the
former inmate's argument that denial of parole or imposition of parole conditions had the
kind of impact on a liberty interest that must be preceded by due process. Id. at 61 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 61 n.1. Even though the inmate had been released on parole since filing suit,
Justice Stevens pointed out that as a parolee, he remained subject to "significant restraints
that might not have been imposed if he had received the kind of hearing that he claims the
Constitution requires." Id. at 63.
302. Id. at 63-64 (footnote omitted). See also Vitek v. Miller, 436 U.S. 407 (1978)




tion may partially explain his narrow view of mootness in this set-
ting.303
(2) How Should the Court Treat
Denials of Certiorari?
During the 1977 Term Justice Stevens began an ardent cam-
paign to persuade his fellow Justices to terminate the practice of
explaining or criticizing denials of certiorari, whether by the Court
or by dissenting members of the Court. In Illinois v. Gray"' the
Court denied certiorari to the Illinois Supreme Court because "the
judgment below rests on an adequate state ground."0 ' Citing three
additional instances in which the Court recently had explained de-
nials of certiorari," Justice Stevens dissented from this explanation
because it was "inconsistent with the rule that such denials have no
precedential value."o3 Similarly, in Huffman v. Florida0 8 he criti-
cized two dissenting Justices whose opinion suggested the basis on
which certiorari had been denied by the Court.3 o Supporting the
Court's denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens stated that:
in making this observation I do not presume to explain the reasons for the
Court's action; I write only to identify this as one of the many cases in which
a persuasive dissent may create the unwarranted impression that the Court
has acted arbitrarily in denying a petition for certiorari.31 0
This attack reached a peak early in the 1978 Term as Justice
Stevens devoted an elaborate opinion in Singleton v.
Commissioner3" to explaining his strict position on denials of cer-
tiorari. Relying primarily on a similar criticism launched by Justice
Frankfurter nearly thirty years ago, 312 Justice Stevens reasoned that
303. See text accompanying note 290 supra; Part m supra.
304. 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
305. Id.
306. Illinois v. Pendleton, 435 U.S. 956 (1978); Michigan v. Allensworth, 435 U.S. 933
(1978); Illinois v. Garlick, 434 U.S. 988 (1977).
307. 435 U.S. at 1013 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
308. 435 U.S. 1014 (1978).
309. The Court gave no explanation for its denial of certiorari in this case, but Justices
Marshall and Brennan in dissent implied that the Court erroneously denied certiorari on the
basis of adequate state grounds. Id.
310. 435 U.S. at 1018 (Opinion of Stevens, J.).
311. 99 S.Ct. 335, 337 (1978) (Opinion of Stevens, J.).
312. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917-19 (1950) (Opinion of
Frankfurter, J.). Justice Frankfurter's statement also provides insight into the many reasons
for denying certiorari:
The sole significance of such denial of a petition for writ of certiorari need not be
elucidated to those versed in the Court's procedures. It simply means that fewer than
four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision of the lower court as
a matter "of sound judicial discretion." A variety of considerations underlie denials of
the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may lead different Justices to the
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the Court is too busy to explain denials of certiorari on a regular
basis, and that even if the Court had sufficient time, the practice
would be inappropriate since denials of certiorari have no preceden-
tial value.3 13 Moreover, he argued that dissenting opinions to denials
of certiorari are potentially misleading, pointing out that:
Since the Court provides no explanation of the reasons for denying certiorari,
the dissenter's arguments in favor of a grant are not answered and therefore
typically appear to be more persuasive than most other opinions. Moreover,
since they often omit any reference to valid reasons for denying certiorari, they
tend to imply that the Court has been unfaithful to its responsibilities or has
implicitly reached a decision on the merits when, in fact, there is no basis for
such an inference.31'
While the substance of Justice Stevens' complaint is harmoni-
ous with the traditional view of the proper approach to denials of
certiorari, his criticism seems to transcend mere judicial economy
and the role of such opinions as precedent. Since the focus of his
complaint is not that the Justices exchange differences in the discre-
tionary review process, but rather that such exchanges are pub-
lished,'31  characterizing his admonition as "Let's Be More Judges
same result. This is especially true of petitions for review on writ of certiorari to a State
court. Narrowly technical reasons may lead to denials. Review may be sought too late;
the judgment of the lower court may not be final; it may not be the judgment of a State
court of last resort; the decision may be supportable as a matter of State law, not subject
to review by this Court, even though the State court also passed on issues of federal law.
A decision may satisfy all these technical requirements and yet may commend itself for
review to fewer than four members of the Court. Pertinent considerations of judicial
policy here come into play. A case may raise an important question but the record may
be cloudy. It may be desirable to have different aspects of an issue further illumined by
the lower courts. Wise adjudication has its own time for ripening.
99 S.Ct. at 337 (quoting 338 U.S. at 917-18).
313. Justice Stevens stated that:
One characteristic of all opinions dissenting from the denial of certiorari is manifest.
They are totally unnecessary. They are examples of the purest forms of dicta, since they
have even less legal significance than the orders of the entire Court which, as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter reiterated again and again, have no precedential significance at all.
Id. at 338.
314. Id. at 338-39.
315. For example, Justice Stevens stated in Singleton that the more beneficial effect
of written statements of reasons over oral contribution at Conference
merely justifies the writing and circulating of these memoranda within the Court; it does
not explain why a dissent which has not accomplished its primary mission should be
published.
The traditional view, which I happen to share, is that confidentiality makes a
valuable contribution to the full and frank exchange of views during the decisional
process; such confidentiality is especially valuable in the exercise of the kind of discre-
tion that must be employed in processing the thousands of certiorari petitions that are
reviewed each year. In my judgment, the importance of preserving the tradition of




and Less Politicians"316 is appropriate. This view is consistent with
his apparently dominant perception of the Court as an adjudicatory
rather than a policymaking body.3 17
On at least one occasion, 3 1 however, Justice Stevens has vio-
lated his own rule. In Minnesota v. Alexanderl' he dissented from
the Court's denial of certiorari and reached the merits of the case.
Although he suggested that appeal, rather than certiorari, may have
been appropriate, without expressly finding that appeal was proper
he impliedly relied on the Court's discretionary review power. Thus
his dissent was equally inappropriate in view of the standards he set
forth in Singleton.
C. Deference to Other Governmental Entities
The Supreme Court is only one of several constitutional entities
that have responsibility for carrying out the political and adjudica-
tory processes of government. Since the Supreme Court, however,
is the ultimate arbiter of the law under the Constitution,3 20 it always
has played a central role in both our political and legal history.
Consequently, the degree of deference that the Court gives to the
other governmental entities is a primary measure of the role the
Court fills in the constitutional framework. Justice Stevens' opin-
ions reflect a relatively strong tendency to defer to the various legis-
lative entities, particularly when he perceives that an issue is more
appropriate for political policymaking than for judicial adjudica-
tion. Furthermore, when the adjudicatory process has been invoked,
he generally treats lower court opinions with substantial respect,
rarely reevaluating factual findings and overruling legal conclusions
only when error is great. This willingness to defer, even when the
Court undoubtedly has the constitutional power to act, demon-
strates that the newest Justice has not been subsumed by the tre-
mendous authority possessed by the Court in our constitutional
system.
(1) Legislative Branches
Justice Stevens frequently allows great deference to Congress 321
and openly criticizes the Court for substituting its judgment for that
316. NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 1978, at 21, col. 1.
317. See Part IV(D) infra.
318. See also Liles v. Oregon, 425 U.S. 963 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). Presumably
his criticism of dissents to denials of certiorari is equally applicable to concurrences that
elaborate on the denial.
319. 430 U.S. 977 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also text accompanying notes
283-89 supra.
320. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
321. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
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of the coordinate legislative body.322 Asked to review the validity of
Environmental Protection Agency regulations, for example, he
stated "[t]he question . . . is not what a court thinks is generally
appropriate to the regulatory process; it is what Congress intended
for these regulations."2 The decision to defer apparently depends
on whether Justice Stevens characterizes an issue as a policy ques-
tion, rather than an adjudicatory matter, and the range of matters
that fall within the former category is unusually large. When review-
ing the validity of a federal statute that denied full Medicare assis-
tance to aliens,"32 Justice Stevens responded that decisions regard-
ing the relationship between the United States and aliens are
"committed to the political branches" 35 of the federal government:
Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign pow-
ers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of
changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently
of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than
to the Judiciary. This very case illustrates the need for flexibility in policy
choices rather than the rigidity often characteristic of constitutional adjudica-
tion . . .. Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of
the political branches of government to respond to changing world conditions
should be adopted only with the greatest caution. The reasons that preclude
judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review
of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration
and naturalization.32'
Although his willingness to defer to state legislatures is less
expansive, particularly when individual rights are at issue,"2 Justice
Stevens acknowledges the constitutional authority of the states to
fashion procedural and substantive laws in a manner considered
most effective by the states:
[T]he arguments in favor of fashioning new rules to minimize the danger of
convicting the innocent on the basis of unreliable eyewitness testimony carry
substantial force. Nevertheless, . . . I am persuaded that this rulemaking
function can be performed "more effectively by the legislative process than by
a somewhat clumsy judicial fiat," . . . and that the Federal Constitution does
not foreclose experimentation by the States in the development of such rules.37
(2) Executive Branch
Justice Stevens is somewhat less deferential in scrutinizing the
322. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
323. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 (1977) (emphasis
added).
324. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). Plaintiff challenged 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2)(B)
(Supp. V 1975), which denied supplemental Medicare assistance to aliens unless they had
been United States residents for at least five years. See text accompanying notes 214-20
supra.
325. 426 U.S. at 81.
326. Id. at 81-82.
327. See Part m supra.
328. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 117-18 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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judgment of administrative agencies than in considering legislative
enactments, but his opinions still demonstrate considerable latitude
when dealing with matters within the expertise of the particular
agency."' In Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRBse he argued that
"regardless of how we might have resolved the question as an initial
matter, the appropriate weight which must be given to the judg-
ment of the agency whose special duty is to apply this broad statu-
tory language to varying fact patterns requires enforcement of the
Board's order.""' He similarly has criticized the Court for its failure
to show such deference for other administrative decisions, faulting
the Court for invalidating Environmental Protection Agency regula-
tions and stating "[t]his is the kind of consequence a court risks
when it substitutes its reading of a complex statute for that of the
Administrator charged with the responsibility of enforcing it."1332
(3) Other Judicial Entities
Justice Stevens' treatment of lower court decisions evidences a
great respect for the judgment of other members of both the state
and federal judiciaries. In particular, his opinions demonstrate a
strong tendency to defer to the judgment of federal court of appeals
and district court judges. A number of factors probably contribute
to this inclination-the desire to avoid duplicative judicial effort,
which arises from his general concern for judicial economy, his rec-
ognition that lower court judges (especially trial judges) are better
able to resolve certain disputes because of their familiarity with the
factual aspects of a case; and the continuing impact of his own
recent experience as a court of appeals judge. For example, in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States=3 Jus-
tice Stevens dissented from the Court's reversal of the court of ap-
peals decision to abstain from asserting federal jurisdiction,33 4 stat-
ing:
329. For an analysis of Justice Stevens' earlier opinions as a court of appeals judge, see
Special Project, supra note 2, at 186. The cases considered here demonstrate considerably
more deference to administrative agencies than did his court of appeals opinions.
330. 429 U.S. 298 (1977).
331. Id. at 304.
332. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 306 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For additional examples of Justice Stevens' deference toward administrative
decisions, see E.1. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), and Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
333. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
334. The United States filed suit in federal court while an action was pending in Colo-
rado state court. Disagreeing with the Court's position on the abstention doctrine, Justice
Stevens stated that:
I find the holding that the United States may not litigate a federal claim in a federal
court having jurisdiction thereof particularly anomalous. I could not join such a disposi-
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[Elven on the Court's assumption that this case should be decided by balanc-
ing the factors weighing for and against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, I
believe we should defer to the judgment of the Court of Appeals rather than
evaluate those factors in the first instance ourselves . . . . Facts such as the
number of parties, the distance between the courthouse and the water in
dispute, and the character of the Colorado proceedings are matters which the
Court of Appeals sitting in Denver is just as able to evaluate as are we.M"
This decision not only is consistent with his anti-abstention posi-
tion,"31 but also indicates Justice Stevens' view that the role of the
Supreme Court is to resolve more vital, substantive issues. Justice
Stevens' special concern for the workload of lower federal court
judges is evident in Brennan v. Armstrong, '3 in which he disagreed
with the Court's summary remand338 of the Milwaukee remedial
school desegregation plan that was developed after considerable
work by the lower courts:
These cases certainly provide no justification for vacating the judgment af-
firming the District Court's conclusion that the petitioners have violated the
Constitution. This Court's hasty action will unfortunately lead to unnecessary
work by already overburdened Circuit Judges, who have given this case far
more study than this Court had time to give it. Nevertheless, it is quite clear
that after respectful reconsideration the Court of Appeals remains free to re-
enter its original judgment."'
Justice Stevens also has deferred to lower federal courts on
matters of law when the lower court is better acquainted with con-
trolling precedent. Writing for the Court in Bishop v. Wood,'3 1 he
deferred to the federal district judge's interpretation of North Caro-
lina law when the state court had not construed the ordinance in
question. 4' Recognizing that the federal district judge sitting in
North Carolina was more familiar with that state's law, he stated
that "[in comparable circumstances, this Court has accepted the
interpretation of state law in which the District Court and the Court
tion unless commanded to do so by an unambiguous statutory mandate or by some other
clearly identifiable and applicable rule of law.
Id. at 826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 827.
336. See text accompanying notes 344-48 infra.
337. 433 U.S. 672 (1977).
338. The district court and the Seventh Circuit ordered development of the remedial
desegregation plan for Milwaukee public schools. The lower courts ordered the plan, however,
before Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), in which the Court set forth
new criteria for drafting desegregation plans. Justice Stevens' primary dispute with the Court
in Brennan was that Dayton applied to remedies, while the Seventh Circuit had decided only
the issue of liability.
339. 433 U.S. at 674-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
340. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
341. Plaintiff, a policeman terminated without a hearing to determine the sufficiency
of cause for discharge, argued that since a city ordinance classified him as a "permanent
employee," he had a property interest in continued employment and hence was entitled to
the fourteenth amendment guarantee of procedural due process. Id.
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of Appeals have concurred even if an examination of the state-law
issue without such guidance might have justified a different conclu-
sion."3 2 Justice Stevens consistently has emphasized such deference
to federal trial courts, acknowledging the trial judge's superior first-
hand knowledge of the facts of the case as revealed during trial.3 13
In one area, however, Justice Stevens generally has been un-
willing to defer to other judicial authority. Although he accords
equal deference to state court decisions in most instances, 44 he has
a narrow view of the abstention doctrine, thus refusing to defer to
state courts when federal jurisdiction also exists.3 11 In two cases his
narrow view of abstention at least partially can be explained by his
pro-individual rights orientation.' The more likely explanation for
this anti-abstention position, however, is his underlying federal-
state relations philosophy. Although Justice Stevens limits the dor-
mant commerce power and usually upholds state regulation of com-
merce when the federal government has not acted, he has a broad
view of preemption and the scope of the affirmative commerce
power once Congress has decided to act.3 7 His analogous view of
federal-state relations in the judicial branch dictates deference to
state courts so long as no federal jurisdiction is invoked, but once
concurrent jurisdiction exists, he gives the federal judicial proceed-
ing precedence. Thus abstention only rarely is appropriate." Jus-
tice Stevens has not articulated this philosophy in the abstention
area, but his treatment of federal-state relations in Vendo Co. v.
Lektro-Vend Corp."' supports the commerce clause analogy. Argu-
342. Id. at 346. See also Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For an opinion in which Justice Stevens' personal familiarity with the lower appellate court
experience is particularly evident, see Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part).
343. E.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 798-99 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
344. E.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 425 U.S. 268 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Part II(B) supra.
345. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring); Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
346. See Part III supra. In Trainor plaintiff welfare recipients filed suit in federal court
challenging a state attachment statute as violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and in Juidice plaintiffs brought a class action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
enjoin enforcement of state court contempt judgments against them.
347. See Part II supra.
348. For example, in Trainor Justice Stevens said, "[t]here should be no abstention
unless the state procedure affords a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy for the federal wrong
." 431 U.S. at 469 n.15.
349. 433 U.S. 623 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The issue in Vendo Co. was whether
the federal anti-injunction statute deprived the federal courts of power to stay state-court
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ing that antitrust enforcement is of sufficient national interest to
outweigh interference with the state's judicial machinery, he stated:
When principles of federalism are invoked to defend a violation of the
Sherman Act, one is inevitably reminded of the fundamental issue that was
resolved only a few years before the anti-injunction statute was passed. Per-
haps more than any other provision in the Constitution, it was the Commerce
Clause that transformed the ineffective coalition created by the Articles of
Confederation into a great nation.m
D. The Court's Role in Policymaking and Adjudicating
A genuine concern for efficiency in the federal judiciary runs
throughout Justice Stevens' opinions as a Supreme Court Justice."'
An equally strong theme, yet one that is not so clearly expressed in
the opinions, is his preference for a Supreme Court that is an adjudi-
cating rather than a policymaking entity. His disapproval of dis-
sents to certiorari denials"' is one manifestation of this view of the
Court. His espousal of relatively limited federal jurisdiction3 3 Su-
preme Court jurisdiction,3 4 and stay power35 further demonstrate
this theme, since those decisions effectively narrow the range of
matters resolved by the Court to those that truly should be consid-
ered "justiciable" controversies.3 56
Justice Stevens does not consider the Court to be a "political
branch" of government.3 11 Without openly espousing an apolitical
role for the Court,"8 Justice Stevens' opinions at least reflect a cal-
litigation that was being prosecuted in direct violation of the Sherman Act. See text accompa-
nying notes 49-54, 290 supra.
350. 433 U.S. at 665. See also id. at 666 n.39.
351. For examples in addition to those discussed earlier in this section, see Justice
Stevens' reliance on judicial economy as a basis for his decisions in Hazelwood School Dist.
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 318-19 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 113-14 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); and Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50
(1976).
352. See Part IV(B)(2) supra.
353. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 2620
(1978) (Stevens, J., concurring).
354. See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 98 S.Ct. 2451 (1978); Sana-
bria v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 2170 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring); Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
355. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Bradley v.
Lunding, 424 U.S. 1309 (1976); Enomoto v. Spain, 424 U.S. 951 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
356. That these decisions support the inference that Justice Stevens prefers an adjudi-
catory Court can be seen by considering the converse. A Justice who favored judicial activism
and who sought to expand the Court's role into the policymaking arena undoubtedly would
favor an expanded view of jurisdiction in order to widen the impact of his policy-oriented
decisions. Justice Stevens' decisions therefore demonstrate the exercise of judicial restraint,
as opposed to judicial activism.
357. See text accompanying notes 325-26 supra.
358. Although the Supreme Court plays a unique role in the constitutional scheme, at
least partially removed from the day-to-day workings of the Government's political machi-
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culated effort to lead the Court away from its political tendencies
and toward pure judicial resolution of legal disputes. For example,
whenever possible, he bases a decision on statutory rather than
constitutional grounds."'9 Statutory analysis provides the Justice
with specific language and legislative history, which contain prede-
termined political judgments, thus reducing the tendency toward
policymaking by the Court.sso Justice Stevens' reliance on statutory
law in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,"' given the
public clamor for a constitutional resolution of the reverse discrimi-
nation issue, shows the degree to which he follows the rule of statu-
tory decisionmaking.
Other opinions, however, indicate that Justice Stevens recog-
nizes the actual tension between the Court's policymaking and ad-
judicating roles. In Runyon v. McCrary362 he addressed this issue in
the context of determining the proper role of precedent. Admitting
that a clear line of authority controlled in the case, and that he
believed that precedent to have been wrongly decided, he expressed
the dilemma as follows:
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, and its progeny have un-
equivocally held that §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits private racial
discrimination. There is no doubt in my mind that that construction of the
statute would have amazed the legislators who voted for it. Both its language
and the historical setting in which it was enacted convince me that Congress
intended only to guarantee all citizens the same legal capacity to make and
enforce contracts, to obtain, own, and convey property, and to litigate and give
evidence. Moreover, since the legislative history discloses an intent not to
outlaw segregated public schools at that time, it is quite unrealistic to assume
that Congress intended the broader result of prohibiting segregated private
schools. Were we writing on a clean slate, I would therefore vote to reverse.
But Jones has been decided and is now an important part of the fabric of
our law. . . . I am persuaded, therefore, that we must either apply the ration-
ale of Jones or overrule that decision.38 3
nery, vestiges of the "political" aspects of the constitutional democracy remain. Even at the
outset the Court was viewed as a political body: "[Tihe Supreme Court of the United States
is the sole tribunal of the Nation . . . .It may even be affirmed that, although its constitution
is essentially judicial, its prerogatives are almost entirely political. Its sole object is to enforce
the execution of the laws of the Union." A. DETOCQUEViHLE, 1 DEMOCRACY N AMERICA 150 (P.
Bradley ed. 1956). Whether the Court's motives are political, decisions such as Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), unquestionably have decisive political impact.
359. E.g., United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 426 U.S. 500 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
360. When the Court relies on the Constitution alone, resolution of the case must
depend on the Court's assessment of more factors, frequently including contemporary societal
needs and occasionally extending to policies inherent in the constitutional structure itself.
Although the Court also may manipulate legislative language and history, the more specific
provisions of a statute limit the Court's ability to fashion the law out of less than whole fabric.
361. 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See Part
m(C) supra.
362. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
363. Id. at 189-90 (footnotes omitted) (Stevens, J., concurring).
JUSTICE STEVENS
Justice Stevens found two reasons for overruling Jones-his firm
conviction that the case had been wrongly decided, and his view
that reliance upon it had not been so extensive as to foreclose the
Court from overruling it. Nevertheless, he found the interest in sta-
bility and orderly development of the law36" and the progress of
national policy toward eliminating racial segregation in society6 5
sufficient to justify its affirmance. Such reliance on national policy,
as perceived by the Court, contradicts Justice Stevens' customary
avoidance of a policymaking role and constitutes an uncharacter-
istic flirtation with judicial activism.
Justice Stevens' most interesting treatment of the relative roles
of policymaking and adjudication occurred in City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises.3" In Eastlake a real estate developer chal-
lenged a state constitutional provision that left the power of referen-
dum to the people with respect to all questions a municipality was
authorized to control by local legislation. A city charter provision,
enacted pursuant to this clause in the state constitution, required a
fifty-five percent referendum approval of all zoning variances.'"
After having his zoning variance request denied by such a referen-
dum, plaintiff contended that the state constitutional provision was
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the people.
The Court rejected plaintiff's argument, pointing out that allowing
a referendum is not a delegation of power, but instead direct partici-
pation in the legislative process through the purest form of voter
democracy.
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing in essence that the town
meeting process of decisionmaking denied procedural due process to
persons seeking zoning variances." Characterizing the referendum
process as a legislative activity, he contended that determination of
individual zoning variances is usually regarded as an exercise of
judicial authority.36' Thus, although appropriate for enacting com-
prehensive zoning plans, he considered the referendum process in-
adequate for resolving individual requests for amendments to the
comprehensive plan. A referendum, moreover, was a "manifestly
364. Id. at 190-91.
365. Justice Stevens stated that overruling should occur only when social mores have
changed, and that in this case they had changed in favor of Jones rather than against it. Id.
This analysis overlooks the possibility that Jones may have been the impetus causing social
mores to change. If so, then the Court that decided Jones engaged in essentially a policymak-
ing, rather than an adjudicating, function.
366. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
367. The city charter also required the party seeking the variance, in this case the
developer, to pay the expenses of the referendum. Id.
368. Id. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
369. Id. at 684.
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unreasonable"3 70 and fundamentally unfair method of handling the
adjudicatory process of zoning changes."' Because majority senti-
ment is subject to "caprice," rather than following articulable stan-
dards, Justice Stevens concluded that the provision did not meet
the requirements of procedural due process.3 7 2
This analysis is interesting in two respects. First, Justice Ste-
vens' treatment of the legislating-adjudicating dichotomy sheds
new light on his view of the Court's role in the constitutional
scheme. On the one hand, his analysis is consistent with his con-
tinuing admonition that the judiciary is the adjudicatory actor and
the legislature is the policymaking actor in the constitutional
scheme. On the other hand, though, his characterization of the
Eastlake referendum process as an adjudicatory procedure threat-
ens those values his philosophy of a self-restraining, adjudicatory
Court is designed to protect. By expanding the range of activities
that fall within the adjudicatory function, and consequently reduc-
ing those that fall into the legislative function, Justice Stevens has
achieved the same result that policymaking by the Court would
produce. The procedural due process argument in Eastlake merely
achieves indirectly what a political Court accomplishes forth-
right-judicial intervention into the policymaking function of the
legislature.
Second, Justice Stevens' characterization of Eastlake as a pro-
cedural due process case seems to miss the real concern underlying
his dissent. Given his primary concern that real estate developers
who seek zoning variances will always be refused by the voters in
370. Id. at 692.
371. Id. at 694. Justice Stevens stated that:
The essence of fair procedure is that the interested parties be given a reasonable
opportunity to have their dispute resolved on the merits by reference to articulable rules.
If a dispute involves only the conflicting rights of private litigants, it is elementary that
the decisionmaker must be impartial and qualified to understand and to apply the
controlling rules.
I have no doubt about the validity of the initiative or the referendum as an appropri-
ate method of deciding questions of community policy. I think it is equally clear that
the popular vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating the rights of individual
litigants. The problem presented by this case is unique, because it may involve a three-
sided controversy, in which there is at least potential conflict between the rights of the
property owner and the rights of his neighbors, and also potential conflict with the public
interest in preserving the city's basic zoning plan. If the latter aspect of the controversy
were predominant, the referendum would be an acceptable procedure . . . . I think the
case should be treated as one in which it is essential that the private property owner be
given a fair opportunity to have his claim determined on its merits.
Id. at 692-94 (footnote omitted).
372. Id. at 690, 694. Parts of Justice Stevens' opinion arguably intimate that he treated
the issue as one of substantive due process. Given the dominant view that such zoning
provisions do not violate substantive due process, however, it seems more likely that he relied
on procedural due process.
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the referendum process, no matter how legitimate their requests, 73
the constitutional challenge should be framed in equal protection
terms. A more appropriate characterization of Justice Stevens'
objection would be that persons who seek zoning changes need pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process-in this context,
therefore, developers seeking zoning variances are a suspect class.
As a result, the judicial process should exercise greater scrutiny to
insure that the disadvantaged group receives fair treatment by the
majority. This goal, however, is one that the equal protection clause
and not the due process clause is designed to achieve. 34
Justice Stevens' activist stance in Runyon and Eastlake clearly
is inconsistent with his preference for an adjudicatory rather than
a policymaking Court. Since the number of decisions demonstrating
the tendency toward judicial restraint far exceeds these two breaks
with that trend, Runyon and Eastlake logically might be considered
insignificant deviations in which Justice Stevens' concern for a par-
ticular aspect of the case caused him to disregard temporarily his
traditional adjudicatory perspective. The appearance of another
decision in which he advocates judicial activism, however, suggests
that exceptions such as Runyon and Eastlake rapidly are becoming
the rule. Early in the 1979 Term, in New Motor Vehicle Board v.
Orrin W. Fox Co.,3 11 Justice Stevens again displayed the procedural
due process bias that appeared in Eastlake.37 ' Despite the Court's
proper deference to the state economic regulation under substantive
due process analysis,7 7 Justice Stevens constructed a procedural
373. See id. at 689.
374. The procedural inadequacy of resolution by direct voter participation is difficult
to discern, since such a procedure is the last vestige of pure democracy. For example, a jury,
which constitutes merely a sampling of the plebiscite that may or may not be representative
of the local community, decides the guilt or innocence of persons accused of crimes. In the
absence of the sixth amendment guarantee to a jury trial, would resolution of the guilt or
innocence of a criminally accused by direct democracy, whereby all the accused's peers cast
their vote, violate procedural due process?
If, however, there is reason to believe that the majoritarian political group regularly
persecutes a distinct minority, a constitutional issue arises-but the appropriate claim is
denial of equal protection, not denial of procedural due process. Moreover, characterization
of Eastlake as a substantive due process case is inappropriate, since no one argued that
plaintiff's property right cannot be diminished. Instead, Justice Stevens' concern was with
how the interference occurred. The distinction put forth by Justice Stevens between affecting
individual rights and societal rights in general simply is not supportable when one recognizes
that each piece of legislation is no more than the adjudication of individual rights by the
legislature.
A possible explanation for Justice Stevens' unwillingness to characterize Eastlake as an
equal protection problem is his discomfort with the traditional equal protection analysis. See
Part H1(C) supra.
375. 99 S.Ct. 403 (1978).
376. Id. at 414-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Part 11(C) supra.
377. Plaintiff challenged a California statute that required automobile manufacturers
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due process argument that allowed him to conclude that the state
statute was unconstitutional."' As in Eastlake, no procedural due
process issue arose in New Motor Vehicle Board.' The effect of
Justice Stevens' procedural due process holding, therefore, would be
to allow judicial intervention into the substantive due process as-
pects of economic regulation, an endeavor that consistently has
been discredited.8 0 The unanswered question is how adamant Jus-
tice Stevens will be in this apparent ideological shift from his domi-
nant attitude of judicial restraint toward judicial activism. Should
it continue, this trend is destined to conflict directly with Justice
Stevens' equally adamant stance in favor of restraint when exercis-
ing the Court's discretionary review power.3 1'
V. CoNcLusIoN
This Special Project has not attempted to discern Justice Ste-
vens' views in specific substantive areas, except to the extent that
they indicate his philosophical orientations in the three spheres of
constitutional adjudication discussed: federal-state relations, indi-
vidual rights, and the role of the Supreme Court. Thus, many sub-
jects, in particular problems of statutory interpretation and fifth
and fourteenth amendment due process questions, have been left
unexplored. 38 2
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Justice Stevens' first three
Terms on the Court is his frequent articulation of highly refined
views on the role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional scheme.
Justice Stevens is particularly vocal in his disagreements with his
senior colleagues on the proper scope of the Court's discretionary
review powers, repeatedly criticizing explanations of and dissents to
certiorari denials, and advocating grants of certiorari only to resolve
to obtain approval of a state board before opening or relocating a retail dealership within the
market area of an existing franchisee if the existing retail dealer objected to the new dealer's
presence. The statute authorized the board to notify the manufacturer that it must obtain
state approval upon the filing of a complaint by the existing dealer, but contained no require-
ment that the board hold a hearing before notifying the manufacturer. The Court recognized
that the statute itself had curtailed the manufacturer's right to franchise at will. Conse-
quently, the issue was whether the restraint of that liberty was substantively permissible.
Following established law in the area of economic regulation, the Court concluded that
requiring approval by the state was proper. Id. at 406-11.
378. Justice Stevens seized upon the absence of a prior hearing requirement before the
manufacturer was notified that board approval was necessary. Id. at 414-18.
379. Justice Brennan's majority opinion succinctly and accurately analyzed the sub-
stantive due process question and amply demonstrated that no procedural issue arose from
the facts of the case. Id. at 409-11.
380. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
381. See Parts IV(B)(1)-(2) supra.
382. Justice Stevens' Supreme Court opinions are catalogued according to subject mat-
ter in the Appendix to this Special Project.
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issues of national importance. Justice Stevens also exhibits a perva-
sive willingness to defer to the judgments of other governmental
entities. In the criminal context, he displays confidence in the deci-
sionmaking capabilities of trial courts by consistently deferring to
trial judge determinations on discretionary matters. Moreover, Jus-
tice Stevens' opinions in both affirmative and dormant commerce
clause cases reveal a tendency to defer to legislative judgments.
When Congress chooses to regulate in a certain area, he normally
defers to the underlying policy choice by finding the need for na-
tional uniformity preemptive of conflicting state provisions. On the
other hand, in the dormant commerce clause context, he interprets
the fact of congressional inactivity as a strong indication that the
matter is appropriate for regulation by local legislative bodies.
Thus, by refusing to substitute his judgment for that of legislative
decisionmakers and trial judges, and by restricting the scope of
discretionary review, Justice Stevens on the surface advocates a
nonactivist, nonpolicymaking, essentially adjudicatory role for the
Supreme Court.
In cases of conflict between government and individuals, Jus-
tice Stevens consistently exhibits a strong pro-individual rights ori-
entation. His opinions in the criminal context indicate a sensitivity
to "Due Process""' considerations: his concern for the efficiency of
the criminal justice system is directed not toward speedy processing
and a high conviction rate, but toward assuring that the judgment
of the most competent decisionmaker prevails. Justice Stevens is
willing to disregard obvious factual guilt in order to achieve the
necessary prophylactic effect. His first amendment opinions also
reflect his basic pro-individual rights position. His reading of the
establishment clause is more strict than that of any other Justice
in that he countenances no public aid to sectarian education. This
rigid interpretation stems partially from Justice Stevens' apprehen-
sion that any state assistance to parochial education would compro-
mise the schools' religious goals, thus impairing the religious free-
dom of those who choose to attend them. In contrast to this strict
reading of the first amendment in the religious establishment area,
Justice Stevens distinguishes criminal and noncriminal methods in
determining the constitutionality of attempts to regulate the dis-
semination of sexually oriented materials. Although he is unwilling
to allow a person to be penalized criminally for the possession or
distribution of objectionable materials, he normally finds that non-
criminal regulatory schemes comport with the first amendment.
Thus, even though Justice Stevens does not advocate unfettered
383. See Part W(A)(1) supra.
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free expression, he refuses to tolerate controls that potentially in-
trude upon an individual's freedom in the form of criminal sanc-
tions.
Even though Justice Stevens has consistently expressed sensi-
tivity to government infringements upon individual liberties, inade-
quacies exist among his individual rights analyses. In the first
amendment context, he has criticized the obscenity standard set
forth in Miller v. California,3  citing the vagueness of the Miller
standard as a principal reason for his refusal to approve criminal
means of regulating obscenity. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens has
not yet suggested an alternative standard. This void is particularly
disturbing since he is willing to permit noncriminal regulation of
sexually oriented matter. Moreover, Justice Stevens has frequently
voiced dissatisfaction with traditional two-tier equal protection
analysis, viewing it as an artificial, result-oriented construct. Again,
despite his consistent refusals to articulate or employ traditional
standards, Justice Stevens has not proffered a workable substitute.
Justice Stevens' dissents in City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises3" and New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co.3
illustrate the danger inherent in his failure to articulate constitu-
tional standards. Justice Stevens' intuitive concern in
Eastlake-that persons seeking zoning changes require judicial pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process-can only be charac-
terized as an equal protection problem. Yet Justice Stevens utilized
a procedural due process argument, perhaps reflecting not only his
recognition that traditional equal protection analysis would have
afforded insufficient protection, but also his recognition that he has
no adequate alternative analysis. Use of the procedural due process
argument, however, cast Justice Stevens into the precise policymak-
ing role that he has consistently repudiated 38 -he might have
avoided contradicting his philosophy of the role of the Court as an
adjudicatory body by employing a viable equal protection analysis.
To the extent that opinions such as Justice Stevens' dissents in
Eastlake and New Motor Vehicle Board in fact result from his yet
unsolidified constitutional analytical framework, the shortcoming
can be corrected, assuming that he develops a more structured anal-
ysis before Eastlake and New Motor Vehicle Board become the rule
rather than the exception. Another possible explanation exists, how-
ever, that is substantially more significant from a constitutional
perspective. These dissents suggest that Justice Stevens may be a
384. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See Part II(B)(1) supra.
385. 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
386. 99 S.Ct. 403 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
087. See Part IV(D) supra.
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judicial activist, despite the express disclaimers contained in many
of his opinions. For example, Justice Stevens' frequent reliance on
deferring to other decisionmakers may be no more than an easy and
obfuscatory manner of achieving the substantive result he desires.
In addition, when achieving the desired result logically seems im-
possible given present constitutional doctrine, Justice Stevens
seems willing to assume an interventionist posture. Moreover, this
intervention to achieve a preferred result is characterized by a will-
ingness to construct unorthodox analyses."* If this alternative ex-
planation is correct, Justice Stevens' actual philosophical stance is
that of a classic judicial activist. Despite his voluminous opinion-
writing in his first three Terms, however, the evidence still is insuffi-
cient to accept conclusively either of the two proferred explanations.
Due to the crucial importance of stability in constitutional adjudi-
cation, which is achieved through consistent, sound analysis and not
through reflexive activist reaction, one hopes the first explana-
tion-the search for an adequate analytical framework-will prove
correct.
GEORGE C. LA III
CHARLES L. SCHLUMBERGER
D. J. SimoNrrI
JAMES D. SPRATT, JR.
JOEL RANDALL TEw
DOUGLAS WILLIAM EY, JR.,
Special Projects Editor
388. An interesting analogy can be drawn between Justice Stevens' procedural due
process approach in Eastlake and New Motor Vehicle Board and the "conclusive presump-
tion" equal protection analysis formulated by Justice Potter Stewart. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). In the
conclusive presumption cases Justice Stewart transformed classic equal protection cases
into procedural due process cases whereas Justice Stevens has generated procedural due
process cases from nonprocedural issues. In both instances the obvious purpose was to
achieve greater judicial scrutiny than traditional constitutional doctrine would allow.
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APPENDIX*
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL
AND STATE GOVERNMENTS
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, rejected a due process challenge to a state's "single-factor" sales formula for apportion-
ing an interstate corporation's income for state income tax purposes, stating that the tax
formula had a rational basis; moreover, he rejected a commerce clause challenge that alleged
differing state taxation formulas unduly burdened interstate commerce.
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, upheld, over substantive due process and commerce clause challenges, a state statute
that prohibited oil producers or refiners from operating retail service stations.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The Court upheld a Maryland
abandoned car statute allegedly favoring residents over nonresidents against a commerce
clause challenge. Justice Stevens concurred, arguing both that the state could not have been
interfering with commerce when its efforts were the source of the commerce and that a state
may experiment with ways to encourage local industry.
B. The Affirmative Commerce Clause
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The Court rejected an eleventh amendment
challenge to provisions making states liable for damages and attorney's fees for unlawful
employment discrimination. Justice Stevens concurred, contending that while the state's
eleventh amendment argument should be rejected since the money damages would not come
directly out of the state treasury, the commerce clause was sufficient to support legislation
regulating terms and conditions of state employment.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Court held amendments to
Fair Labor Standards Act applying minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost
all state employees unconstitutional insofar as those provisions would operate to directly
displace the states' ability to structure employee-employer relationships in areas of tradi-
tional government functions. Justice Stevens dissented, finding it inconsistent to uphold
statutes applying employment discrimination provisions, taxes, safety regulations, and envi-
ronmental protection provisions to states but not to allow the Fair Labor Standards Act to
do so.
C. The Scope of Federal Legislation
(1) Federal Preemption
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180
(1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, limited preemption of state labor proceedings
by the National Labor Relations Act to those controversies that were identical to what could
have been presented to the National Labor Relations Board.
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). The Court determined that federal
legislation preempted a state regulation requiring special safety features on larger tankers
* This Appendix includes all cases in which Justice Stevens wrote opinions during his
first three Terms on the Supreme Court. The entries do not purport to state specific holdings.
The intention is only to indicate and contrast the broad areas of concern addressed by the
Court and by Justice Stevens. The subject matter divisions are entirely arbitrary and artifi-
cial: when a case overlapped two or more areas, it was placed in the category in which it was
discussed principally in text. Finally, the cases are arranged in reverse chronological order
within each heading.
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using state ports, while simultaneously upholding special tug pilotage requirements that
applied only to tankers lacking these features. Justice Stevens dissented, stating that if a
state could not impose the safety features, it could not impose special restrictions when these
features were lacking.
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977). The Court held that section 16 of
the Clayton Act, which authorizes federal injunctive relief against antitrust violations, is not
an "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits federal
courts from enjoining state court proceedings unless expressly authorized by federal statute.
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that section 16 of the Clayton Act should be construed
broadly in order to give effect to the overall policies of the antitrust laws.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
held that a state's approval of a tariff program is not sufficient state participation to exempt
the program from the federal antitrust laws.
Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). The Court found that federal labor law preempted state
law when the conduct in question arguably was covered by the National Labor Relations Act
and when the conduct consisted of peaceful economic weapons in support of bargaining
demands. Justice Stevens' dissent argued that federal labor law should preempt state law
only when the conduct was arguably covered by the National Labor Relations Act.
(2) Sovereign Immunity
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, upheld over an assertion of tribal sovereign immunity, a state statute that
regulated Indian fishing on the reservation.
Minnesota v. Alexander, 430 U.S. 977 (1977). The Court denied certiorari and let stand a
court of appeals ruling that the Army Corps of Engineers was exempt from state water
pollution regulations. Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act possibly constituted a congressional waiver of the Army Corps of Engineers'
immunity from state water pollution regulation.
United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977). The Court held that a state-imposed
use tax on federal employees living in tax exempt federally owned housing did not violate
the supremacy clause since the property was in the possession of a private citizen. Justice
Stevens dissented on the grounds that the state use tax discriminated between federal em-
ployees residing on federal property and a private tenant residing on comparable non-tax
exempt property.
II. THE CoNSntrIoNAL RIGS OF Tm AccusED CRuiNAL
A. The Pretrial Context
(1) Search and Seizure
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The Court held that the newspaper's first
amendment rights were not violated when police, pursuant to a warrant, searched the prem-
ises for photographs of demonstrators who had allegedly assualted police. Justice Stevens,
dissenting, found a violation of the fourth amendment probable cause requirement since the
subject of the search was not involved in any wrongdoing and would not destroy the evidence.
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). The Court held that official entries to investigate
the cause of a fire after it has been extinguished and the firefighters have left the premises
must adhere to the warrant procedures of the fourth amendment. Justice Stevens, concurring
in the judgment, nevertheless rejected the Court's suggestion that an "administrative search




Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). The Court held that a body search by a police
officer following an order to get out of a car was permissible under the fourth amendment.
Justice Stevens dissented, objecting to the low standard of justification required for searches
and seizures and arguing that the fourth amendment requires inquiry into the particular facts
of a case.
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). The Court upheld a mail search pursuant to
a federal statute that applied the "border search" exception to the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement as to the opening of international mail. Justice Stevens dissented,
arguing that the statute did not authorize the challenged search.
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977). The Court held that evidence procured by
wiretap need not be suppressed when the government unintentionally failed to identify to the
judge issuing the warrant the names of every person committing the offense. Justice Stevens,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, found that the government had failed to comply
with the congressional desire to eliminate abusive wiretapping procedures.
(2) Miranda Warnings
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The Court held that absent a showing of cause
for noncompliance and a showing of actual prejudice, federal habeas corpus review of
Miranda claims was barred by a defendant's failure to make timely objection under a Florida
"contemporaneous objection" rule that required motions to suppress evidence to be made
before trial. Justice Stevens concurred, emphasizing that no precise definition of the "cause
for noncompliance and actual prejudice" exception to the contemporaneous objection rule
should be set forth, but instead, that the showing necessary to overcome an asserted waiver
should depend on the character of the constitutional right involved and the circumstances of
the individual case.
United States v. Jacobs, 429 U.S. 909 (1976). Justice Stevens, concurring in the Court's
memorandum order to remand, held that a grand jury witness may be prosecuted for perjury
even though the prosecutor failed to give the witness adequate warnings.
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). The Court held that a parolee who voluntarily
came to a police station and confessed was not in custody or deprived of freedom so as to be
entitled to a Miranda warning. Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that the confessor
was a parolee and therefore technically in legal custody of the police.
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). The Court upheld a warrantless arrest, finding
that a doorway is a public place for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Stevens
pointed out in concurrence that the police had sufficient information to get a warrant, there-
fore failure to do so was either a justifiable decision or, if not, harmless.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The Court held that the use of evidence of petitioner's
silence for purposes of impeachment after he was given a Miranda warning violated the due
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Stevens dissented, contending
that since silence can be used for impeachment in the absence of a Miranda warning, no
reason for a different rule exists when the warning was given.
(3) Right to Counsel
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). The Court found that an arrested murder suspect
was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel when police officers obtained incriminating
remarks from the accused after having promised the accused's lawyer not to interrogate the
accused until counsel had spoken with him. Justice Stevens concurred on the grounds that
the accused was deprived of counsel during a "critical stage" of his prosecution.
B. The Trial Context
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). The Court found a denial of due process when a
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state court judge refused to instruct the jury on the presumption of defendant's innocence
after the prosecutor's closing argument suggested that the status of defendant was an indica-
tion of guilt. Justice Stevens, dissenting, differentiated between instructions that were consti-
tutionally defective and those that were merely improper.
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978). The Court upheld defendant's conviction after he
had objected to the trial judge calling attention to his failure to testify by issuing a cautionary
instruction that the jury was to ignore this fact. Justice Stevens, dissenting, emphasized the
individual's right to determine instructions, and the fact that the waiver of a cautionary
instruction was less significant than the waiver of fifth amendment protection that is pres-
ently permitted.
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977). The Court struck down as violative of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination a New York statute that terminated the
party office of any political party officer subpoenaed by a grand jury to testify concerning
the conduct of his office and who refused to testify or to waive immunity against subsequent
criminal prosecution. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the state's legitimate interest
in preventing corruption justified the imposition of the "waiver" condition to officials holding
high public offices.
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found
that a trial judge's inadvertent failure to instruct the jury on causation in a second degree
murder trial was not constitutional error.
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976). The Court upheld a state statute providing
two tiers of courts for certain crimes, the first of which did not allow a jury trial, but the
second of which provided de novo review. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the law
impermissibly burdened the right to trial by jury absent the state's giving a reason for the
procedure, especially since the jury may be aware of the prior conviction.
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens found
that the prosecution's failure to tender the victim's criminal record to defense counsel did
not deprive the defendant of a fair trial under the fifth amendment since the record was not
requested by the defense and because it gave rise to no inference of perjury.
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976). Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens held
that defendant's plea of guilty to a charge of second degree murder was involuntary when
defendant was not given adequate notice of the elements of the offense.
Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976). The Court held that a government writing
subject to production under the Jencks Act is not made nonproducible because the govern-
ment interviewed the witness and wrote the statement. Justice Stevens concurred in order
to point out the difference between a producible statement and work product.
C. The Post-Conviction Context
(1) The Double Jeopardy Clause
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held
that the exercise of sound discretion by a trial judge in granting a prosecution motion for a
mistrial satisfied the standard of necessity required to avoid a valid double jeopardy plea.
Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977). A plurality of the Court held that a defendant
convicted of a lesser included offense had waived his double jeopardy objection to subsequent
prosecution for the greater offense by opposing the government's motion in the first trial for
consolidation of the indictments. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the finding of a
waiver was not justified because of the procedural circumstances under which the defendant
had opposed the government's motion for consolidation.
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). The Court held that the
double jeopardy clause precludes retrial following a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29(c)
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of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Justice Stevens concurred on the grounds that
although the Criminal Appeals Act provides the government with authority to appeal dis-
missals, the government is without authority to appeal acquittals.
(2) Appeals, Sentencing, and Punishment
Hutto v. Finney, 98 S.Ct. 2565 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, held that
conditions in a state prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment, upheld remedial
measures that limited punitive isolation to thirty days, and awarded attorney's fees to plain-
tiff inmates following bad faith conduct by state officials.
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). The Court rejected ex post facto and equal protec-
tion challenges to a Florida death penalty statute. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that
since there was no constitutional Florida statute that imposed the death penalty at the time
the offense in question was committed, the ex post facto clause was violated.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that
a state judge's imposition of the death penalty based upon a confidential report that the
accused had no opportunity to deny or explain deprived the accused of due process of law.
United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976). The Court held that provision of a free
transcript prior to a motion for vacation of the judgment by a person convicted of a federal
crime was not required by the Constitution. Justice Stevens dissented, finding that fairness
required that a transcript be granted to all indigent appellants, particularly since a transcript
must be granted if the defendant enters a motion for appeal.
m. FIRsT AMENDMENT
A. Free Expression
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
upheld a Federal Communications Commission order that found a radio broadcast indecent
under 5 U.S.C. section 554(e). The opinion focused primarily on a statutory interpretation of
the term "indecent," which was deemed not limited only to language having a prurient
appeal. Justice Stevens peripherally addressed first amendment freedom of speech protec-
tion, which he said did not prohibit all regulation of speech content, particularly in broadcast-
ing.
Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978). The Court included sensitive or deviant
persons, but excluded children, from its definition of the community by whose standards
obscenity was to be judged. Justice Stevens concurred, pointing out his disagreements with
obscenity law that were detailed in his earlier dissents.
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). The Court held that a jury of fewer than six persons
was unconstitutional under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Justice Stevens, concur-
ring, stated that he adhered to his earlier views expressed in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188 (1977), wherein he stated that the existing constitutional standards that apply to criminal
prosecutions were so intolerably vague as to make evenhanded enforcement of the law vir-
tually impossible.
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). The Court upheld summary judgment against
an inmate's claims that state officials violated his constitutional rights and 42 U.S.C. sections
1983 and 1985 by negligently interfering with his outgoing mail. Justice Stevens dissented on
the ground that the record did not foreclose the possibility that plaintiff could disprove
defendants' good faith defenses.
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). The Court rejected
inmates' first amendment and equal protection challenges to North Carolina Department of
Correction regulations that prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates to join a prison-
ers' union, barred the union's meetings, and prevented delivery of bulk mailings of union
publications from outside sources. Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's opinion regarding
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the union meeting and bulk mailing claims, but dissented in part, arguing that the nonsolici-
tation regulations were broader than the Court's definition of a legitimately prohibited activ-
ity and should have, to that extent, been invalidated.
Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977). The Court rejected vagueness and overbreadth chal-
lenges to an Illinois obscenity statute. Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the
statute in question failed the fair notice requirement of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973).
Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977). The Court rejected first amendment and ex post
facto challenges to a California obscenity conviction. Justice Stevens dissented from the
Court's disposition of the first amendment issue on the grounds that under the challenged
jury instructions it was possible that the conviction rested solely on a truthful, nonoffensive
description of nonobscene matter, and from the Court's disposition of the ex post facto
challenge on the grounds that defendant had the right to rely on California case law retroac-
tively reversed by the California legislature after the acts for which he was prosecuted had
been committed.
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977). The Court upheld petitioner's conviction for
mailing obscene materials in violation of a federal statute. Justice Stevens dissented on the
grounds that the obscenity standards were too vague to provide the basis for criminal prosecu-
tion.
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Court held that a Michigan
statute that authorized union representation of local government employees and required all
employees represented by a union, whether or not union members, to pay union dues could
not, under the first amendment, be applied to require contributions to support an ideological
cause as a condition of public employment. Justice Stevens concurred, noting that the Court's
opinion did not reject the argument that no fee whatsoever could be exacted from nonunion
public employees without first establishing a procedure that would avoid any risk that their
funds would be used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated to collective
bargaining.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). The Court held that the due process clause
precluded retroactive application of obscenity standards to defendant's alleged misconduct
and remanded the case for a new trial. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, disagreed with the majority's remand for new trial, finding that this criminal prosecu-
tion was based on unconstitutionally vague obscenity standards.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens rejected the vagueness challenge to an "anti-skid row" zoning ordinance, stating that
plaintiffs did not seek a waiver under the allegedly vague provision and that the ordinance
could be narrowed by state courts.
B. Free Press
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 2588 (1978). The Court held that the first amendment
did not give the press a right of access to controlled government information. Justice Stevens,
dissenting, stated that first amendment protection extends not only to the dissemination, but
to the receipt and gathering of information.
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Court held that absent a
showing that less drastic alternatives would not suffice, a pretrial gag order violates the first
amendment right of free press. Justice Stevens concurred, indicating that prior restraints on
freedom of the press are an impermissible method of ensuring a fair trial.
C. Establishment Clause
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). The Court upheld, against an establishment clause
challenge, portions of an Ohio statute that authorized state aid to sectarian school pupils in
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the form of loans of secular textbooks, standardized educational testing services, and various
health services; the Court, however, struck down portions of the statute that authorized the
state to provide sectarian school pupils with loans of secular instructional materials other
than textbooks and with field trip services. Justice Stevens dissented in part, arguing that
only those portions of the statute authorizing public health services were constitutional.
Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). The Court rejected an establishment
clause challenge to the use of state funds for church-related higher education. Justice Stevens'
dissent emphasized that a state subsidy may tempt the school to compromise its religious
mission.
IV. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS UNDER THE
FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
A. Equal Protection
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978). The Court held that
the university's preferential minority admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which incorporated equal protection as the standard of discrimination. Justice
Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, refused to address the constitutional issue
on the ground that the plain wording of Title VI precluded all forms of racial discrimination.
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). The Court rejected an equal protection challenge to
a state statute that prevented aliens from being policemen, stating that strict scrutiny was
inapplicable since the position involved the formulation, execution or review of public policy.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, stated that police work did not qualify for this strict scrutiny
exemption, and that the Court's opinion was inconsistent with precedent.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Court sustained an equal protection challenge
to a Wisconsin statute that prohibited noncustodial parents under court order to support their
minor children from marrying without a judicial finding that support obligations had been
met. Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, wrote to distinguish Califano v. Jobst, 434
U.S. 47 (1977), under which a congressional decision to terminate disability payments upon
marriage was held to be rational under the fifth amendment.
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, found a congres-
sional decision to terminate certain disability payments upon marriage rational under the
fifth amendment.
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). The Court vacated a judg-
ment of the court of appeals that imposed a "systemwide" remedy in a school desegregation
case and remanded the case for a determination whether local school officials intended to and
did in fact discriminate against minority pupils. Justice Stevens, concurring, emphasized
that a finding of intent to discriminate depends primarily on objective evidence of the effects
of school officials' actions.
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977) (per curiam). The Court vacated the judgment of a
three-judge district court, which held that an early filing deadline for independent political
candidates was per se an unconstitutional burden on the candidates' right of access to the
ballot. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the state had offered no justification for the
early filing requirement, which discriminated against independents by forcing them to make
the decision to run earlier than members of political parties.
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). The Court concluded that a Social Security Act
provision that required a widower to prove that one-half of his support came from his wife
violated the due process clause because the provision afforded female workers less protection
for their surviving spouses than was provided to male employees. Justice Stevens, concurring,




Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). The Court rejected
an excluded Indian tribe's equal protection and due process challenge to a statute that
authorized a monetary distribution to certain Indian tribes as a redress for the government's
breach of treaty. Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that the exclusion of the aggrieved
Indian tribe was unjust and arbitrary.
Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1977). The Court held that a state court's finding that an
age of majority statute was constitutional with respect to females did not fully comply with
the Supreme Court's mandate to eliminate gender-based discrimination in the age of majority
statute. Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that the result of the state court determina-
tion was consistent with the Supreme Court mandate.
Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, upheld federal
and state regulations that disallowed, for purposes of computing the income of food stamp
recipients, deductions for transportation expenses in connection with a job training program.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Court invalidated a state law which prohibited beer
sales to males under age twenty-one and to females under age eighteen under an equal
protection challenge. Justice Stevens, concurring, held that the classification was objection-
able because it was based purely on an accident of birth.
Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976). The Court upheld a statute creating a presumption
of dependency only for some illegitimate children for purposes of determining eligibility for
Social Security survivor's benefits. Justice Stevens dissented for the reasons offered in Ma-
thews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). The Court upheld a Social Security provision that
did not extend survivor's benefits to illegitimate children, finding no reason to impose strict
scrutiny. Justice Stevens dissented, viewing the classification as one based on administrative
convenience (thus not sufficient under a rational basis analysis) and considering illegitimates
a traditionally disfavored class.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court rejected application of the Title VII
"disparate impact" test to a claim of discrimination based on the fifth amendment, requiring
a finding of "purposeful discrimination." Justice Stevens concurrred in the result, finding
that while the discriminatory purpose required by fifth amendment cases could be shown by
objective as well as subjective evidence, there was no such evidence in this case.
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
held that the Civil Service Commission may not bar lawfully admitted resident aliens from
employment in federal civil service without showing some national interest justifying such
discrimination.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens held
that Congress may discriminate among aliens by requiring five years of continuous residency
for eligibility for Medicare benefits; although protected by the due process clause, aliens do
not enjoy all the rights of citizens.
B. Procedural Due Process
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978). The Court held that a
public utility failed to meet due process requirements in terminating plaintiff's utility service,
which, under state law, was deemed a statutory property entitlement. Justice Stevens, dis-
senting, found no constitutional defect in the method of termination.
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). The Court upheld against a due process challenge an
Illinois statute that authorized the revocation of drivers licenses without a pretermination
hearing. Justice Stevens, concurring, noted that the Court had not rejected the constitutional
analysis of the district court.
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Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The Court held that the exercise by a state court of
quasi in rem jurisdiction was subject to the "minimum contacts" standard of due process set
forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Because of uncertainty
as to the reach of the Court's opinion and fear that the Court had decided more than was
necessary to dispose of the case, Justice Stevens concurred only in the judgment.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). The Court held that procedural due process
safeguards were unnecessary prior to the administration of disciplinary corporal punishment
at a public school. Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that post-deprivation remedies
were insufficient when there was an invasion of an individual's interest in freedom from bodily
harm.
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976). The Court found that a federal parolee imprisoned
for a crime committed while on parole was not entitled to a parole revocation hearing immedi-
ately upon issuance of a parole violator warrant. Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds
that an immediate hearing on the parole violator warrant was an essential element of proce-
dural fairness because such a hearing might have affected the length of the parolee's confine-
ment.
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976). The Court held that a prisoner was not entitled
to a hearing prior to transfer from one institution to another. Justice Stevens' dissent cited
the prisoner's allegation that he was being transferred because he circulated a petition and
rendered legal services to other inmates in finding a hearing justified.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). The Court found no due process protections for a
prisoner being transferred from one institution to another. Justice Stevens dissented, stating
that law is not the source of liberty and finding a prisoner's liberty interest deserving of
constitutional protection.
C. Substantive Due Process
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Court held unconsti-
tutional a New York statute that prohibited distribution of contraceptives to persons under
age sixteen, distribution of contraceptives by anyone other than a licensed pharmacist, and
advertisement of contraceptives by anyone. Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's opinion
regarding prohibition of contraceptive advertising and prohibition of distribution of contra-
ceptives by anyone other than a licensed pharmacist, and concurred in the judgment regard-
ing prohibition of distribution of contraceptives to persons under age sixteen on the ground
that denial of contraceptives to such persons deprived them of liberty without due process of
law because it exposed them to risks of pregnancy and disease.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The Court concluded that a city
ordinance that limited occupancy of single unit dwellings to certain enumerated persons
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Stevens, concurring,
found that because the ordinance intruded upon the rights of the owner to choose who lives
on his property, the ordinance constituted an unconstitutional taking of property without due
process or just compensation.
Alexander v. Fioto, 430 U.S. 634 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, rejected a
fifth amendment due process challenge to a federal statute that denied retirement pay to
national guardsmen unless they had served in active duty during World War II.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, held that a
statute that required physicians to identify patients using certain drugs in order to record
their names in a centralized computer file did not violate the patient's constitutional right
of privacy.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Court, examining Missouri's
abortion statute, held that the provisionis requiring spousal consent and parental consent for
unmarried women under eighteen were unconstitutional. Justice Stevens, concurring in part
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and dissenting in part, found that the parental consent requirement was constitutional be-
cause of the state's interest in the welfare of its young citizens.
D. State Action
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). The Court found no state action for fourteenth
amendment purposes to sustain defendant's challenge of the nonconsensual self-help eviction
remedies contained in Uniform Commercial Code section 7-210. Justice Stevens, dissenting,
stated that the enactment of the statute was sufficient state action.
V. THE ROLE OF THE COURT
A. The Exercise of the Court's Discretionary Review Power
Vitek v. Jones, 436 U.S. 407 (1978) (per curiam). The Court vacated as moot a challenge to
a state statute authorizing the transfer of a nonconsenting state prisoner to a mental hospital
upon a finding of need by a physician or psychologist because defendant had since consented
to the medical treatment. Justice Stevens dissented, stating that consent did not moot the
procedural challenge.
Huffman v. Florida, 435 U.S. 1014 (1978). Justice Stevens, concurring in the Court's denial
of certiorari, objected to a Justice's dissent on the grounds that it created an unwarranted
assumption that the denial was arbitrary.
Illinois v. Gray, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978). Justice Stevens, concurring in the Court's opinion
denying certiorari, objected to the Court's practice of explaining its denials on the grounds
that certiorari denials lack precedential value.
National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327 (1977). Justice Stevens, sitting
in his capacity as Circuit Justice, denied an application for a stay of an Illinois trial court's
injunction prohibiting Nazis from displaying the swastika during a demonstration.
Oregon State Penitentiary v. Hammer, 434 U.S. 945 (1977). The Court vacated a judgment
of the Oregon Supreme Court, which held that termination of a state employee without a
pretermination hearing violated procedural due process, and remanded the case for reconsi-
deration in light of Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). Justice Stevens dissented on the
grounds that certiorari should have been denied, arguing that when a state court extends
greater procedural protection than the federal constitution requires, the Court should deny
review until a conflict develops on the national level.
Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977). The Court rejected an
equal protection challenge to an Idaho statute that granted unemployment benefits to night
students and denied them to day students. Justice Stevens dissented, stating that certiorari
should have been denied since the question was not of national importance.
Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977) (per curiam). The Court again vacated judg-
ment and remanded for reconsideration in light of intervening decisions a case involving the
adequacy of a remedial school desegregation plan. Justice Stevens dissented on the ground
that certiorari should have been denied because the court of appeals had correctly construed
one of the intervening decisions and had not decided the issue affected by the other interven-
ing decision.
School District of Omaha v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977) (per curiam). The Court
vacated judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of intervening decisions a case
involving the adequacy of a remedial school desegregation plan. Justice Stevens dissented on
the ground that certiorari should have been denied because the court of appeals' disposition
of the case satisfied the requirements of the intervening decisions.
Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (per curiam). The Court
refused to review a lower court judgment that invalidated certain Environmental Protection
Agency regulations in which the Environmental Protection Agency had announced its inten-
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tion to modify the regulations. Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that the issue was
not moot until the Environmental Protection Agency actually rescinded or modified the
regulation.
Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board, 429 U.S. 60 (1976) (per curiam). The Court remanded for
consideration of mootness a case involving a procedural due process challenge to a denial of
parole. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that even though the petitioner had been paroled
shortly before certiorari was granted, the case was not moot because of petitioner's claim that
less restrictive parole conditions might have been imposed had a fair hearing been held on
his original application.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976). The Court upheld standing for doctors challenging
a state law that excluded abortions from purposes for which the poor may obtain Medicaid
benefits, holding, inter alia, that doctors could assert rights of patients. Justice Stevens
concurred, expressing doubt as to standing based on the rights of a patient.
Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471 (1976). Justice Stevens concurred in the dismissal of
certiorari finding that dismissal was not objectionable since the state of the law was suffi-
ciently clear, particularly in view of the change of opinion of one of the Justices who had
initially voted to accept certiorari.
Liles v. Oregon, 425 U.S. 963 (1976). Concurring in the denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens
stated that a grant of certiorari would have been a waste of time, since the Court would not
depart from its holding in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which presented the same
issues.
Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976). Despite the prosecutor's decision not to reopen an
obscenity prosecution, the Court granted a writ requesting that the record of the Florida
Supreme Court affirmation of defendant's conviction be vacated and expunged following
remand by the United States Supreme Court. Dissenting, Justice Stevens found no need for
the writ since there was no further prosecution.
B. Deference to Other Governmental Entities
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, disallowed damages for "loss of society" that are generally available in maritime
wrongful death actions on the grounds that federal enabling legislation limited survivor's
recovery to "pecuniary loss."
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). The Court held that a warrantless search
by OSHA officials violated the fourth amendment. Justice Stevens dissented, on the grounds
that industry subject to close regulation was excepted from the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement, and that even should a warrant be required, the Court should prohibit ex parte
proceedings without a showing of probable cause.
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). The Court, after engaging in
a detailed first amendment analysis, denied a broadcast company's request to market copies
of the Watergate tapes while the various defendants' appeals were pending. Justice Stevens,
dissenting, viewed the issue as one solely within the discretion of the trial court.
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978). The Court sustained the
dismissal of an indictment under the Clean Air Act, holding that the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency regulation that defendant had allegedly violated was not an "emission standard"
within the meaning of the Act. Justice Stevens dissented, objecting to a statutory construc-
tion that would restrict the Environmental Protection Agency's regulatory authority.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). The Court rejected a due process challenge to a
state criminal conviction based in part on pretrial identification evidence obtained by an
unnecessary and suggestive police procedure. Justice Stevens concurred on the ground that
the identification satisfied the appropriate tests of reliability.
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United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977). The Court rejected a due process challenge
to a criminal indictment based on an eighteen-month preindictment delay. Justice Stevens
dissented on the ground that the record failed to support the Court's conclusion that the
government's delay was justified.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977). The Court held that interference by a federal
court with an ongoing civil enforcement action in state court was improper unless state
remedies for the aggrieved party's due process claim were inadequate. Justice Stevens dis-
sented on the grounds that when state action patently and flagrantly violated the Constitu-
tion, federal courts need not defer to state courts.
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977). The Court held that a federal court could not properly
entertain a section 1983 action that interfered with a state's contempt process when the
aggrieved parties had the opportunity to pursue their federal claims in state court. Justice
Stevens, concurring, found that the state proceeding in this case satisfied the requirements
of the due process clause.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for
the Court, upheld Environmental Protection Agency regulations that imposed industry-wide
limitations on water pollution.
Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977). The Court rejected the due process claim of a policeman
dismissed without a hearing when information in the policeman's personnel file indicated a
history of suicide attempts. Justice Stevens dissented, holding that a hearing must be pro-
vided regardless of the apparent justification for the policeman's dismissal.
Bayside Enterprises v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
upheld the National Labor Relations Board's determination that truck drivers in the poultry
industry were not subject to the National Labor Relations Act since they were not agricultural
laborers.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, upheld the
district court's interpretation of state law that a policeman serves at the will of the city and
so has no property interest in his job entitling him to a pretermination hearing.
Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976) (per curiam). The Court denied a motion for
leave to file a complaint challenging the constitutionality of a state tax on the generation of
electricity, stating that a pending suit in state court provided an adequate forum. In concur-
rence, Justice Stevens pointed out that Arizona failed to allege that the New Mexico tax
affected electric rates in Arizona, thus making the complaint insufficient.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The Court held
that the failure of the Republic of Cuba to return funds mistakenly paid by Dunhill was not
an "act of state" by Cuba which would preclude a judgment against the country. Justice
Stevens agreed with the Court's "act of state" rationale, but failed to base his concurrence
on the Court's subsequent discussion of sovereign immunity.
Diamond National Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 425 U.S. 268 (1976). The Court
reversed a state court decision holding that the burdens of state and local sales taxes fall upon
national banks, exempt from taxation under federal law, as purchasers. Justice Stevens'
dissent contended that while the Court is not bound by state supreme court decisions, it must
accept state interpretation of the obligations of parties under a state statute.
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The
Court held that while the doctrine of abstention did not apply to a case dealing with water
rights, considerations of judicial administration called for deference to the state courts in this
case. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the United States should have access to the
courts in this type case, and that the weighing of factors of judicial administration should be
left to the courts of appeals.
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C. The Court's Role in Policymaking and Adjudicating
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 2620 (1978). The
Court held that the Price-Anderson Act liability limitation on nuclear accidents violated
neither fifth amendment due process nor equal protection concerns. Justice Stevens, concur-
ring, stated there was no federal jurisdiction because plaintiff environmental group lacked
standing.
Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 98 S.Ct. 2451 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing
for the Court, declined review of a district court's refusal to certify a plaintiff's class action
thereby refusing to expand the scope of 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a)(1), which limits interlocu-
tory appeals from orders denying injunctions to those situations in which irreparable injury
is probable.
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978). The Court denied the government's request
for a retrial after defendant was acquitted of a gambling charge. Justice Stevens, concurring,
concluded that the Court lacked jurisdiction for the appeal.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The Court reversed a
judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court, which had held that the first amendment immunized
the news media from damage actions for broadcasting a performer's act without his consent.
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that because the state court's opinion could be read as
resting either solely on independent state grounds or solely on federal constitutional grounds,
the case should be remanded for clarification.
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). Finding that a convicted murderer made a knowing
and intelligent waiver of all federal rights, the Court dissolved the stay of execution of his
death sentence. Justice Stevens, concurring, found that in the absence of a proper litigant
the Court had no power to further stay the execution.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The Court dismissed a state inmate's section 1983
claim alleging that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because of inadequate
treatment of a back injury while in prison. Justice Stevens, dissenting, urged that a pro se
complaint be liberally construed and that the Court inquire further into the type of medical
treatment the inmate received.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The Court held that 42 U.S.C. section 1981
prohibited private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to
prospective students because they were black. Justice Stevens concurred, finding that while
the holding was not justified by the legislative history of section 1981, the Court must follow
the relevant authority to ensure stability and orderly development of the law.
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976). The Court held that a
referendum was not an unlawful delegation of power by the state legislature and that its use
regarding a zoning change did not violate due process. Justice Stevens dissented, finding that
since there were no articulable standards to which a referendum decision could be held, it is
an arbitrary method of adjudicating the rights of individuals and so is inappropriate for that
purpose.
United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 426 U.S. 500 (1976). The Court upheld an
Interstate Commerce Commission requirement that carriers use revenues from an increase
in a tariff for the purposes claimed in support of the increase. Justice Stevens' dissent argued
that the power to require such action was not given the Interstate Commerce Commission
by Congress.
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976). The Court resolved an apparent
conflict between venue provisions of the National Bank Act and the Securities Exchange Act
in favor of the more specific provisions of the National Bank Act. In dissent, Justice Stevens
found the language of the National Bank Act to be permissive rather than mandatory;
further, he argued that the rule announced by the Court favoring specificity would as easily
support the primacy of the Securities Exchange Act.
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Bradley v. Lunding, 424 U.S. 1309 (1976). Sitting as Circuit Justice, Justice Stevens denied
a request for a stay of judgment because petitioners did not demonstrate sufficient probability
of irreparable injury.
Enomoto v. Spain, 424 U.S. 951 (1976). The Court granted a stay of judgment entered by a
district court. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that petitioners did not demonstrate that
irreparable damage would be caused by the judgment.
VI. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Antitrust Laws
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978). The Court held that
intent was an essential element of criminal, but not civil price-fixing under section one of
the Sherman Act. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, rejected both
the Court's intent criteria and intent analysis as creating an unprecedented distinction be-
tween criminal and civil antitrust enforcement that could adversely affect civil enforcement.
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, declared that a professional association's ethical canon that
prohibited competitive bidding violated section one of the Sherman Act.
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 U.S. 610 (1977). Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, held that the "uniqueness" of the tying product by itself did not
establish sufficient economic power necessary to prove an illegal tying arrangement under
section one of the Sherman Act.
B. Civil Rights Laws
(1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
invalidated a pension fund provision that required women to make larger contributions based
on their longer life expectancy on the grounds that it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). The Court held that denial of accumulated
seniority to female employees returning from pregnancy leave violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment "on the understanding that
as the law now stands, although some discrimination against pregnancy-as compared with
other physical disabilities-is permissible, discrimination against . . . formerly pregnant
employees is not."
Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). The Court vacated and
remanded for further proceedings a judgment of the court of appeals, which had found local
school officials engaging in teacher employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the judgment should have
been affirmed because defendant school officials had offered virtually no evidence to rebut
the government's prima facie case.
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, found that an employer did not commit a continuing violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to credit seniority dating back to the original employment
to a rehired employee who had failed to file a timely Title VII claim following his termination.
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Court held that the exclusion of
pregnancy-related disabilities from a corporation's sickness and accident benefits plan did
not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds
that exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from the plan by definition discriminated on
the basis of sex.
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Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976). The Court held that section 717 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 is the exclusive remedy for discrimination in federal employment. Justice Stevens
dissented, finding that the legislative history clearly indicated that Congress did not intend
the Act to be an exclusive remedy.
(2) Miscellaneous Provisions
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court overruled prior
case law and held that municipalities were "persons" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
Justice Stevens, concurring, deemed a portion of the Court's opinion only advisory.
United States v. Board of Commissioners, 435 U.S. 110 (1978). The Court concluded that
Sheffield was a "political subdivision" for purposes of compliance with voting rights legisla-
tion that required political subdivisions to obtain prior federal approval before altering voting
qualifications. Justice Stevens, dissenting, construed the voting rights statute narrowly be-
cause of its infringement on traditional state sovereignty.
C. Internal Revenue Code
First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Tax Commission, 437 U.S. 255 (1978).
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, upheld a state tax on federal savings and loan associa-
tions that was not applied to credit unions, based on an interpretation of the term "similar"
in federal legislation restricting state taxation of federal savings and loans to those taxes
imposed equally on similar local institutions.
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). The Court validated a sale and
leaseback arrangement that allowed depreciation by the lessor and rent deduction by the
lessee. Justice Stevens dissented, stating that under the realities of the arrangement, the
deductions should have been disallowed since the "lessee" was, for all intents and purposes,
the actual owner.
Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co., 433 U.S. 148 (1977). Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the "net valuation" portion of unpaid life insur-
ance premiums, but not the "loading" portion of such premiums, must be included in a life
insurance company's assets, gross premium income, and reserves in computing its federal
income tax liability.
United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976). The Court held that "taxable
income" within the meaning of I.R.C. section 172 (carryback and carryforward of net operat-
ing losses) included capital gains as well as ordinary income. Justice Stevens, concurring,
noted that although he would have preferred as a matter of policy the result favored by the
dissent, the statute did not support such a construction.
Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977). The Court disallowed an
accrual-basis corporate taxpayer's deductions under I.R.C. section 404(a) for promissory
demand notes contributed to a qualified employees' profit-sharing plan. Justice Stevens,
concurring, noted that the majority's construction of I.R.C. section 404(a) best served the
statutory purpose of protecting the integrity of pension plans.
D. Securities Laws
Sante Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The Court held that a short-form merger
carried out pursuant to state statute was neither deceptive nor manipulative and therefore
minority shareholders had no cause of action under Rule lOb-5. Justice Stevens, concurring
in part and dissenting in part, expressed his disapproval of the majority's refusal to recognize
any fiduciary duty owed by controlling shareholders to minority shareholders under Rule 10b-
5.
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court held that a tender offeror,
suing as a takeover bidder, did not have standing to bring an action for damages under either
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section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Rule 10b-6 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the tender offeror, because it
was a shareholder, was within the class protected by section 14(e).
E. Miscellaneous Federal Provisions
Parker v. Flook, 98 S.Ct. 2522 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, held that a
patent application in which the only novel feature was the use of a mathematical formula
did not present patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act.
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 98 S.Ct. 2454 (1978). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
stated that an appeal from a class decertification as a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. section
1291, pursuant to the "death knell" doctrine, had no jurisdictional basis because the "death
knell" doctrine was a legislative, not a judicial concept that would frustrate the administra-
tion of justice.
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978). The Court held that the Freedom
of Information Act did not give an employer access to prehearing testimony obtained by the
National Labor Relations Board in an unfair labor practices investigation. Justice Stevens,
concurring, interpreted the term "interference" in section 7 of the Act to exempt such testi-
mony from disclosure because of potential interference with enforcement proceedings.
California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1978). The Court ruled that the Federal
Power Commission acted within its statutory powers in requiring Federal Power Commission
approval before termination of the flow of gas from a field subject to a certificate of unlimited
duration. Justice Stevens, dissenting, construed the enabling statute more narrowly than did
the Court.
J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 586 (1978). The Court held that employees of
a subcontractor once removed from the prime contractor were not protected by the Miller
Act since they did not have a direct contractual relationship with either the prime contractor
or a "subcontractor" within the meaning of the Act. Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that
the Court's narrow interpretation of "subcontractor" was contrary to the intent of Congress.
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). The Court upheld the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act against former President Nixon's
claims that the Act was unconstitutional in that it violated the separation of powers principle,
the bill of attainder clause, and Nixon's own privacy interests and first amendment associa-
tional rights. Justice Stevens, concurring, stated that special legislation directed only at one
former President normally would violate the bill of attainder clause, but that former Presi-
dent Nixon's resignation from office and acceptance of a pardon for offenses committed while
in office placed him in a different class from all other Presidents.
Third National Bank v. Impac Limited, 432 U.S. 312 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for
the Court, found that Congress, in enacting a statute prohibiting attachments, injunctions,
or executions from being issued against a national bank before final judgment in a state court
action, intended only to prohibit state judicial action having the effect of seizing the bank's
property prior to final judgment.
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia could not entertain a habeas
corpus application of a petitioner sentenced by a local District of Columbia court.
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Sailboat Apartment Corp., 429 U.S. 911 (1976). The Court
remanded the case for determination of whether there was a waiver of the venue provision of
the National Bank Act. Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that the state court had
already rejected the claim of improper venue on the basis of waiver.
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). The Court held that a
federal court could not enjoin a sympathy strike pending the arbitrator's decision as to
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whether the strike was forbidden by the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining contract.
Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that a sympathy strike, clearly in violation of the
contract, should be enjoinable because the employer would be threatened with irreparable
injury.
Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Co., 426 U.S. 407 (1976). The Court held that the Texas right to
work law did not extend to seamen whose situs of employment was not in Texas. Justice
Stevens concurred, joining the majority opinion except to the extent, if any, that it suggested
that federal policy enunciated in the National Labor Relations Act favors union or agency
shops.
